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IDEOLOGICAL COHESION AND PRECEDENT 
(OR WHY THE COURT ONLY CARES ABOUT 
PRECEDENT WHEN MOST JUSTICES AGREE 
WITH EACH OTHER)• 
NEAL DEVINs•• 
This Article examines the profound role that ideological 
cohesion plays in explaining the Supreme Court's willingness to 
advance a coherent vision of the law-either by overruling 
precedents inconsistent with that vision or by establishing rule-
like precedents intended to bind the Supreme Court and lower 
courts in subsequent cases. Through case studies of the New 
Deal, Warren, and Rehnquist Courts, this Article calls attention 
to key differences between Courts in which five or more Justices 
pursue the same substantive objectives and Courts which lack a 
dominant voting block. In particular, when five or more Justices 
pursue the same substantive objectives, the Court is far more 
willing to overturn precedent and embrace rule-like precedent. 
In contrast, when there is not a dominant voting block, the Court 
will either rule narrowly so as to keep its options open or issue 
seemingly broad rulings that are in tension with, but do not 
overrule, the important precedents of past Courts. By 
highlighting the profoundly important role of ideological 
cohesion among the Justices, this Article also offers a 
commentary on the models that political scientists use to describe 
judicial decisionmaking. Unlike political science models which 
focus on the desire of individual Justices to pursue favored policy 
outcomes, this Article suggests that the key variable in 
understanding Supreme Court policymaking is the presence or 
absence of five or more ideologically simpatico Justices at a 
particular moment in time. Finally, this Article speculates on the 
future of precedent on the Roberts Court. Noting that the 
Roberts Court lacks a dominant voting block, this Article 
suggests that the Roberts Court is unlikely to overrule significant 
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precedent or issue significant rule-like decisions (at least until a 
new President is able to use the appointment power to create a 
dominant voting block). 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article will advance a commonsense argument about the 
Supreme Court's willingness to establish a coherent vision of the 
law-either by overruling precedents inconsistent with that vision or 
by establishing rule-like precedents intended to bind the Supreme 
Court and lower courts in subsequent cases. Specifically, this Article 
will call attention to the profound role that ideological cohesion plays 
in explaining the Court's willingness to embrace a coherent or 
incoherent vision of the law. When five or more Justices pursue the 
same substantive objectives, the Court will act as a coherent body. It 
will overrule precedents inconsistent with its vision and will establish 
constitutional precedents that embrace a coherent view of the law. In 
sharp contrast, when five or more Justices do not share the same 
vision of the law, Court decisionmaking will be defined by either 
divergent voting blocks or the predilections of so-called swing 
Justices. Lacking ideological cohesion, such a Court will not advance 
a consistent view of the law. For example, rather than establish a 
clear line of constitutional precedent, an incoherent Court will, at 
various times, rule narrowly so as to keep its options open or issue 
seemingly broad rulings that are in tension with, but do not overrule, 
the important precedents of past Courts. 
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This Article will illustrate differences between coherent and 
incoherent Courts through abbreviated case studies of the New Deal 
Court, the Warren Court (pre- and post-1962),1 and the Rehnquist 
Court. The New Deal Court and post-1962 Warren Court exemplify 
the practices of coherent Courts-striking down important decisions 
inconsistent with their policy preferences and establishing bold 
precedents (many of which were truly trailblazing-advancing the 
Justices' preferences with little regard for earlier Court 
decisionmaking).2 In this way, the dominant coalitions on the New 
Deal Court and post-1962 Warren Court recognized that precedents 
were both opportunities and constraints-a mechanism to advance 
their vision of the law while simultaneously placing limits on lower 
courts and possibly on subsequent Supreme Courts.3 Moreover, since 
1. With respect to the Warren Court, there is some controversy over whether the 
early Warren Court ended in 1961 (when the Court began ruling in support of civil 
liberties interests) or 1962 (when Arthur Goldberg joined the Court, so that there was a 
solid block of five Justices backing progressive positions). Compare Jeffrey A. Segal & 
Harold J. Spaeth, Decisional Trends on the Warren and Burger Courts: Results from the 
Supreme Court Data Base Project, 73 JUDICATURE 103, 104 (1989) (arguing that the 
Goldberg appointment was largely inconsequential to the trajectory of Warren Court 
decisions), with Mark Tushnet, The Warren Court as History, in THEW ARREN COURT IN 
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 1, 7 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993) (arguing that 
the Goldberg appointment was transformative). In my view, the Goldberg appointment 
transformed the Warren Court. As Lucas Powe points out, Segal and Spaeth's data does 
not take into account key cases that were held over-so that the Court could be 
reconstituted after the retirement of conservative-leaning Justice Charles Whittaker. 
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 498 (2000). In 
any event, the debate over whether 1961 or 1962 is the critical year is largely irrelevant to 
the points made in this Article. The key point is that there was a solid block of five or 
more Justices willing to back up progressive positions. 
2. See infra Part II. For an article highlighting the dearth of cited precedents in the 
landmark rulings of the post-1962 Warren Court, see generally James H. Fowler & 
Sangick Jeon, The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent, 30 Soc. NETWORKS 16 (2008). 
For a complimentary perspective in this Symposium, see generally Lee Epstein et al., On 
the Capacity of the Roberts Court To Generate Consequential Precedent, 86 N.C. L. REV. 
1299 (2008) (highlighting critical role that ideological cohesion plays in determining 
Court's willingness to write significant decisions); and Nancy Staudt et al., On the Role of 
Ideological Homogeneity in Generating Consequential Constitutional Decisions, 10 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 361 (forthcoming 2008) (empirical study highlighting role of ideological 
homogeneity in generating consequential precedents). 
3. See THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF 
PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 12-14 (2006). For a provocative and 
somewhat competing perspective, see Tonja Jacobi & Emerson H. Tiller, Legal Doctrine 
and Political Control, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORO. 326, 341-42 (2007) (arguing that Supreme 
Court Justices will take into account lower court policy preferences when sorting out 
whether to embrace standards that give greater discretion to lower courts or rules that 
hamstring lower courts). As a theoretical matter, Jacobi and Tiller's argument makes 
sense. But, for me, it is a model that needs to be backed up with facts-as I do not think 
that the Justices are as nuanced in their calculations as are Jacobi and Tiller. 
HeinOnline -- 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1402 2007-2008
1402 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
there was a majority of ideologically simpatico Justices on these 
Courts, the Chief Justice could use his opinion assignment power on 
the basis of the organizational needs of the Court and not ideology.4 
On the other hand, the early Warren and Rehnquist Courts 
lacked a dominant coalition and, as such, were unable to free 
themselves of the shackles of precedent. Rather than feel 
empowered to advance their vision of legal policy, these Courts either 
operated in the shadow of earlier precedent or, alternatively, steered 
clear of establishing meaningful constitutional precedents. Their 
decisions thus amounted to a hodgepodge of constitutional 
avoidance, judicial minimalism, and the refusal to reconcile 
inconsistencies between past precedent when establishing seemingly 
contradictory constitutional doctrines. With respect to opinion 
assignments, the Chief Justice (or, if the Chief Justice dissented, the 
Senior Associate Justice in the majority) was more strategic-paying 
significant attention both to ideology and the need to make sure that 
five Justices would sign onto a majority opinion.5 
Notwithstanding dramatic differences in the decisionmaking 
styles of coherent and incoherent Courts, these Courts (and that is to 
say, all modern Courts) approach the making or overruling of 
constitutional precedents as a means to an end-not something 
possessing significant, independent force.6 Coherent Courts pursue 
their vision of legal policymaking with zeal and are quite willing to 
overrule significant precedents that embrace a competing legal 
regime.7 For incoherent Courts, their failure to overturn significant 
precedents has little to do with some abstract belief in the rule-of-law 
benefits of stare decisis.8 Rather, incoherent Courts simply lack the 
4. See Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahelbeck, A Conditional Model of Opinion 
Assignment on the Supreme Court, 57 POL. REs. Q. 551,551 (2004). 
5. See id. 
6. The political science literature likewise describes precedent in instrumental 
terms-arguing that the Court preserves its political capital by acting like a court (making 
use of existing legal rules and principles). Consequently, while disagreeing over the 
constraints that precedent places on judicial policymaking, there is general agreement that 
the Justices cite precedent in order to demonstrate their legitimacy. See LEE EPSTEIN & 
JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 163-77 (1998) (arguing that precedent 
limits the Justices in their pursuit of favored policies); HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 
3, at 24-30 (arguing that the Justices legitimate policy choices by citing precedent); 
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 76-85 (2002) (arguing that precedent is cited for 
legitimacy purposes but does not meaningfully restrict judicial discretion). 
7. See infra Part II. 
8. For the classic rule-of-law defense of stare decisis, see Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992). For additional discussion, see infra notes 60-63 
and accompanying text. 
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votes-there is no dominant coalition pushing the Court to embrace 
some shared vision of legal policymaking.9 Indeed, by either refusing 
to establish constraining precedents or by keeping on the books 
seemingly irreconcilable precedents, incoherent Courts have little use 
for a theory of stare decisis grounded in the stability of precedent. 
This Article is divided into three parts. Part I examines 
incoherent Courts. It discusses in some detail the swing-Justice-
dominated Rehnquist Court, drawing distinctions between the 
decisionmaking styles of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Part I also 
discusses the pre-1962 Warren Court, highlighting that Court's use of 
constitutional avoidance on national security issues. Part II examines 
coherent Courts. It uses the New Deal Court to illustrate the Court's 
willingness to overrule significant precedents in order to repudiate 
one legal regime (laissez-faire) in favor of another regime. Part II 
also uses the post-1962 Warren Court to demonstrate the ways a 
coherent Court feels unbounded by law in order to establish its vision 
of optimal legal policymaking. Part III ties together the case studies 
in a forward-looking way, speculating on the future of precedent in 
the Roberts Court.10 
Before turning to Part I, a comment about the models that 
political scientists employ to describe judicial decisionmaking is 
necessary. Focusing on the desire of individual Justices to pursue 
favored policy outcomes, political scientists typically see Supreme 
9. By emphasizing the presence or absence of a dominant coalition, this Article is 
not arguing that the vitality of precedent is linked to the size of the coalition that votes for 
a decision. See HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 3, at 126 (finding that coalition size has 
little impact on whether a precedent is interpreted positively or negatively). The point, 
instead, is that the existence of a dominant coalition is figurative in the Court's willingness 
both to overrule past precedents and establish bold precedents. See Epstein at al., supra 
note 2. 
10. Although this Article examines the New Deal, Warren, and Rehnquist Courts, the 
line that separates one Court from another is not the Chief Justice who presides over that 
Court. The focus, instead, is whether or not there is a solid coalition of five or more 
Justices who are ideologically simpatico-which may exist for some but not other years of 
any Chief Justice's tenure. For that reason, the Warren Court seems incoherent before 
1962 and coherent afterwards. Also, there is an inevitable murkiness to the labels 
"coherent" and "incoherent." The degree of agreement among Justices varies, even in a 
coherent Court. The second Warren Court, for example, became more liberal and more 
coherent after Thurgood Marshall joined it. See Segal & Spaeth, supra note 1, at 107. 
Likewise, the substitution of Clarence Thomas for Thurgood Marshall moved the 
Rehnquist Court to the right-but not enough to make it a coherent Court. See infra Part 
I.A. Needless to say, there is sufficient turnover among Supreme Court Justices to suggest 
that the relative coherence/incoherence of a particular Court will vary over time. At the 
same time, the basic point of this Article remains true: the more cohesive the Court, the 
more likely the Court is to pursue a coherent vision of legal policymaking; conversely, the 
more incoherent the Court, the less likely the Court is to pursue a coherent vision. 
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Court Justices as simply voting their policy preferences (the 
attitudinal model) or making strategic choices to maximize their 
policy preferences-taking into account institutional legitimacy 
concerns as well as the preferences of other Justices and/or elected 
officials and the American people (the strategic actor model)Y This 
Article approaches things in a somewhat different way and, in so 
doing, provides a commentary of sorts about the dominant political 
science models. In particular, by paying attention to whether there 
are five or more ideologically simpatico Justices at a particular 
moment in time, this Article suggests that different political science 
models work best in describing discrete Courts (the Rehnquist Court, 
the New Deal Court) or discrete periods of time (pre- versus post-
1962 Warren Court). This will be developed further in Part Ill, 
highlighting a preference for a Court-centered view of judicial 
decisionmaking to a Justice-centered model. In so doing, Part Ill 
links this Article with the models that political scientists employ to 
describe judicial decisionmaking. 
I. INCOHERENT COURTS 
The Rehnquist and early (pre-1962) Warren Courts exemplify 
the practices of incoherent Courts. The Rehnquist Court did not 
overturn significant, controversial precedents of the Burger and post-
1962 Warren Courts.12 It did not break significant doctrinal ground 
outside of federalism, and its federalism revival was itself incoherent 
(limited in reach and marred by decisions that seemed to contradict 
each other).13 Moreover, it often divided five to four on controversial 
cases, with the Court's so-called swing Justices (Anthony Kennedy 
and Sandra Day O'Connor) sometimes voting with the "liberal" wing 
11. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 6 at 86-97 (describing the attitudinal model); 
EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 6, at 10--12 (describing the strategic actor model). For a 
somewhat competing account of the strategic model, see Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & 
Andrew Martin, The Political (Science) Context of Judging, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 783, 798 
(2003) (suggesting that-notwithstanding earlier claims by most researchers (including 
themselves)-the strategic model sees Justices maximizing "goals," not simply policy 
preferences). 
12. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 570 (2003); Robert F. Nagel, Bowing to 
Precedent, WKLY. STANDARD, Apr.17, 2006, at 24. 
13. See Linda Greenhouse, Foreword: The Third Rehnquist Court, in THE 
REHNQUIST LEGACY, at xiii, xiv, xx (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006); Merrill, supra note 12, 
579-81, 586-87 (noting shift from social issues to issues of federalism); Peter J. Smith, 
Federalism, Instrumentalism, and the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 906, 907-08 (2006). 
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of the Court and sometimes joining forces with the Court's 
"conservative" wing.14 
The early Warren Court was likewise sharply divided, issuing a 
significant number of five-to-four decisions on controversial cases. 15 
It too was reluctant to overturn significant constitutional precedents 
and had shifting voting alignments.16 And while it issued some 
watershed rulings,17 it made repeated use of "constitutional 
avoidance" techniques to sidestep constitutional rulings on free 
speech challenges to antisubversive legislation.18 
In explaining Rehnquist and early Warren Court approaches to 
the making and following of precedent, this Article will focus on two 
abbreviated studies. For the Rehnquist Court, it will take a hard look 
at the Court's seemingly contradictory decisionmaking in Washington 
v. Glucksberg,19 which rejected a constitutional challenge to assisted-
suicide prohibitions, and Lawrence v. Texas,20 which invalidated 
same-sex sodomy laws. Glucksberg, as will be explained, exemplifies 
the Rehnquist Court's practice of keeping its options open in 
subsequent cases-either by making fact-specific rulings and/or by 
minimizing precedents that are not backed by a majority of the 
14. See Dahlia Lith wick, A High Court of One: The Role of the "Swing Voter" in the 
2002 Term, in A YEAR AT THE SUPREME COURT 13 (Neal Devins & Davison M. Douglas 
eds., 2004). For additional discussion, see infra Part I.A. 
15. During the 1960 Term, for example, the Court split five to four on twenty-three of 
fifty-three non-unanimous civil liberties cases. See Segal & Spaeth, supra note 1, at 104. 
For additional discussion, see infra Part I.B. 
16. During its 1953-1961 Terms, the Court overturned eleven precedents (as 
compared to the thirty-one it overturned during its 1962-1968 Terms). See Lori A. 
Ringhand, The Rehnquist Court: A "By the Numbers" Retrospective, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
1033, 1075-77 (2007) (compiling data). For additional discussion, see infra Part I.B. 
17. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), broke significant doctrinal ground. In 
particular, by finding that challenges to legislative apportionment were justiciable, Baker 
overturned Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), and laid the groundwork for judicial 
challenges to legislative distinctions. The pre-1962 Warren Court also broke doctrinal 
ground in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp both established the exclusionary 
rule and overturned longstanding precedent. For a discussion of the Court's willingness to 
overrule precedent in Mapp, see LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND 
AMERICAN POLITICS 195-99 (2000). For a discussion of Baker's significance, see Stephen 
Ansolabehere & Samuel Issacharoff, The Story of Baker v. Carr, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW STORIES 297 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004). See also infra notes 142-46 and 
accompanying text (discussing the post-1962 Warren Court's dramatic expansion of Baker 
in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)). 
18. For an excellent treatment of early Warren Court avoidance, see generally Philip 
P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process 
Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CAL. L. 
REV. 397 (2005). For additional discussion, see infra Part I.B. 
19. 521 u.s. 702 (1997). 
20. 539 u.s. 558 (2003). 
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Justices. That the Court overruled Texas's sodomy ban in Lawrence 
underscores the ultimate irrelevance of the Glucksberg precedent. 
Against this backdrop, this Article will provide additional details 
about the Rehnquist Court's reluctance to impose constraints on itself 
or lower courts through rule-like decisions. 
For the early Warren Court, this Article will examine the 
constitutional avoidance and domestic security cases (beginning with 
the pro-communist Red Monday cases and ending with the Court's 
seeming abandonment of those cases)Y Like the Rehnquist Court, 
the early Warren Court kept its options open. By making use of 
statutory, not constitutional, law the Court did not have to overturn 
(or even confront) precedent when retreating from its earlier rulings. 
Correspondingly, the pre-1962 Warren Court's reluctance to overrule 
or establish significant constitutional precedents reflects the absence 
of a solid coalition able to advance a single ideological agenda. 
A. The Rehnquist Court22 
The Rehnquist Court (1986-2005) promised, but did not deliver, 
a constitutional revolution. With four Justices nominated by Ronald 
Reagan (and with all four on the Court from 1987-2005),23 the 
Rehnquist Court seemed destined to embrace Reagan's brand of 
judicial conservatism. When running for President in 1980 and 1984, 
Reagan both pledged to appoint judges who "share our commitment 
to judicial restraint" and reached out to social conservatives by 
condemning Supreme Court decisions on school prayer, busing, and 
especially abortion.24 In particular, Reagan called for the overruling 
of Engel v. Vitale25 and Roe v. Wade26-saying that "God should 
[never] have been expelled from the classroom" and that Roe was as 
divisive and wrong as Dred Scott v. Sanfor~7 had been.28 
21. See infra Part I.B.l. 
22. Portions of this Section are drawn from Neal Devins, Substantive Due Process, 
Public Opinion, and the "Right" To Die, in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY, supra note 13, at 
327. 
23. Reagan nominee Anthony Kennedy was confirmed in February 1987, joining 
Reagan appointees Antonin Scalia, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.supreme 
courtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). 
24. 1984 Republican Party Platform, reprinted in 40 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 55-B (1984). 
25. 370 u.s. 421 (1962). 
26. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
27. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 383 (1856). 
28. See Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with the Student Body of 
Providence-St. Mel High School in Chicago, Illinois, 1 PUB. PAPERS 600, 603 (May 10, 
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The social conservative agenda, however, was not the agenda of 
the Rehnquist Court. By steering a centrist path, the Rehnquist 
Court avoided controversy and, for the most part, tracked public 
opinion.29 Furthermore, with shifting voting alignments and a 
propensity to divide five to four (doing so in more than twenty 
percent of all cases and in a much higher percentage of controversial 
cases),30 the Rehnquist Court's identity was largely defined by the 
voting predilections of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy.31 On 
abortion and school prayer, O'Connor and Kennedy, citing concerns 
of stare decisis and the Court's legitimacy, cast key votes to reaffirm 
the essential holdings of Roe and Engef.32 Indeed, "Republican 
domination of the (Rehnquist] Court" did not result "in the 
overruling of a single revolutionary Warren Court decision."33 
This is not to say that the Justices were unwilling to overturn 
precedent. The Rehnquist Court overturned forty-four constitutional 
precedents.34 The Court's targets, however, underscore the 
incoherence of Rehnquist Court decisionmaking. The Court steered 
neither a liberal nor a conservative path when overturning precedents 
(reaching liberal results in forty-one percent and conservative results 
in fifty-nine percent of these cases).35 More than that, the Rehnquist 
Court was highly selective in its invocation of stare decisis-taking 
the doctrine seriously when it backed up the result it preferred and 
ignoring it when it did not.36 
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy held the key to the Court's on-
again, off-again approach to both making and adhering to precedent. 
These two Justices had dramatically different styles-and, not 
1982) (commenting on school prayer); RONALD REAGAN, ABORTION AND THE 
CONSCIENCE OF THE NATION 16-21 (1984) (commenting on Roe & Dred Scott). 
29. See Neal Devins, The Majoritarian Rehnquist Court, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
63,63 (2004); Jeff Rosen, Center Court, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,June 12,2005, at 17, 17-18. 
30. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, 
AND DEVELOPMENTS 240-41 (4th ed. 2007) (detailing results in Table 3-4). 
31. As to whether O'Connor or Kennedy was the "most powerful" Justice, compare 
JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 7 (2007) (arguing that O'Connor is the most powerful noting 
"few Justices in history dominated a time so thoroughly or cast as many deciding votes as 
O'Connor"), with Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice: The 
Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics, 70 S. CAL. L. REV 63, 96 (1996) (describing 
Kennedy as the most powerful). 
32. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994) (upholding legality 
of abortion); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (limiting school prayer in public 
schools). 
33. Nagel, supra note 12, at 24. 
34. See Ringhand, supra note 16, at 1040 tb1.3. 
35. /d. 
36. See infra notes 37-86. 
HeinOnline -- 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1408 2007-2008
1408 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
surprisingly, dramatically different approaches to precedent. Also, 
their willingness to join a majority opinion (rather than filing a 
concurrence agreeing with the result but not the reasoning) 
sometimes hinged on the Court embracing a view of the law that 
seemed limited to the case at hand. In other words, rather than 
embrace a determinative view of some legal issue, the Court signaled 
that the doctrinal formula used in one case might well be limited to 
that case-either because of the narrowness of the ruling or the 
failure of the ruling to either cite or repudiate prior precedents. To 
make these points more concrete, this Article turns to Washington v. 
Glucksberfi37 and Lawrence v. Texas. 38 
1. Washington v. Glucksberg 
Written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist (for a five-member 
majority that included Justices Kennedy and O'Connor), Glucksberg 
found that there is no right to assisted suicide by applying "[ o ]ur 
established method of substantive-due-process analysis."39 In fact, 
Glucksberg is a mess-filled with omissions, internal inconsistencies, 
and a general disregard of the precedent it claims to follow. The 
explanation: the Chief Justice thought it better to sacrifice a clear 
statement of doctrine in order to secure the votes of Justices Kennedy 
and O'Connor.40 
To win over Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Rehnquist could not 
favorably cite Bowers v. Hardwick. 41 In Bowers, the Court concluded 
that states can criminalize same-sex sodomy and, in so doing, limited 
the sweep of substantive due process protections.42 Contending that 
the Court "is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when 
it deals with judge-made [rights]," Bowers confined substantive due 
process to those rights that are grounded in our nation's legal 
traditions and practices.43 In Glucksberg, the Court appeared to 
embrace and extend Bowers. It declared that fundamental rights 
37. 521 u.s. 702 (1997). 
38. 539 u.s. 558 (2003). 
39. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720. 
40. The Chief Justice's willingness to strike such a deal followed his practice of 
"'[taking] each case as it came.'" Jeffrey Rosen, Rehnquist the Great?, ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY, Apr. 2005, at 79, 87 (quoting Michael K. Young, a former Rehnquist clerk). 
This practice advanced his agenda without worrying about whether his decision cemented 
"'an overarching theory of substantive constitutional interpretation.'" /d. (quoting Jack 
Goldsmith of Harvard Law School). 
41. 478 u.s. 186 (1986). 
42. See id. at 190-91. 
43. !d. at 194. 
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must both be "objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and 
tradition'" and" 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' "44 
But Justice Kennedy disapproved of Bowers. Before casting the 
key vote in Lawrence v. Texas45 (overturning Bowers), Justice 
Kennedy had signaled his discomfort with Bowers. In 1996, he wrote 
the majority opinion in Romer v. Evans,46 a decision rejecting (on 
equal protection grounds) a Colorado law prohibiting the granting of 
"protected status" to gays.47 Kennedy's decision made no mention of 
Bowers48-even though Justice Scalia's dissent strenuously argued 
that it was nonsensical for the Court to allow one state to criminalize 
same-sex sodomy while forbidding another state from denying 
protected status to gays.49 
Assuming that Justice Kennedy would not sign on to a decision 
that strongly backed Bowers, the Chief Justice may have thought it 
better to ignore Bowers than to risk losing one of the Justices in his 
fragile five-member coalition. For similar reasons, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist seemed to limit Glucksberg's reach in order to secure 
Justice O'Connor's vote. In a telling footnote, he acknowledged that 
his "opinion does not absolutely foreclose" future challenges to 
assisted-suicide laws.5° For such a challenge to succeed, however, the 
Court would have to depart from the standard it employed in 
Glucksberg, namely, that substantive due process rights be 
"objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' "51 
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor made clear that she 
would not join an opinion that absolutely barred substantive due 
process challenges to assisted-suicide laws. Noting that a mentally 
competent person experiencing great pain may have a fundamental 
right to hasten his or her death, Justice O'Connor joined Glucksberg 
insofar as there was "no reason to think the democratic process" 
would not strike the appropriate balance on the issue.52 For his part, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist was glad to have Justice O'Connor join his 
44. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (internal citations omitted). 
45. 539 u.s. 558 (2003). 
46. 517 u.s. 620 (1996). 
47. /d. at 631-32. 
48. !d. at 623-36. 
49. See id. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If it is rational to criminalize the conduct, 
surely it is rational to deny special favor and protection to those with a self-avowed 
tendency or desire to engage in the conduct."). 
50. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,735 n.24 (1997). 
51. See id. at 720-21. 
52. !d. at 737 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Stephen Breyer supported the 
recognition of such a fundamental right and consequently joined the O'Connor 
concurrence "except insofar as it joins the majority." !d. at 789 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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opinion-even if it meant adding a footnote directly at odds with the 
decision's purported methodology.53 
In addition to making concessions to Justices Kennedy and 
O'Connor, Glucksberg is replete with references to contemporary 
practices and the sensibility of state bans on assisted suicide. 54 To put 
it plainly: by following several different paths in Glucksberg, the 
Court did little more than announce an outcome. More than that, 
Glucksberg's cavalier attitude to existing precedent (most notably, its 
refusal to discuss Bowers) suggests that subsequent courts need not 
even discuss Glucksberg when deciding the next relevant dispute. 
Witness, for example, the Court's 2003 decision in Lawrence v. 
Texas. 55 
2. Lawrence v. Texas 
The irrelevance of Glucksberg as a precedent and the competing 
decisionmaking styles of Justices Kennedy and O 'Connor were on full 
display in Lawrence. This Section starts with Justice Kennedy's five-
member majority opinion, in which Glucksberg played no role. 
Although overruling Bowers, Kennedy did not endeavor to 
distinguish the opinion he joined in Glucksberg.56 But, as the 
Lawrence dissent made clear, the two decisions could not be 
reconciled.57 In particular, rather than sort out whether a 
constitutional right to sodomy (or same-sex sodomy) is "objectively, 
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,' "58 Lawrence 
speaks of "[f]reedom extend[ing] beyond spatial bounds," of 
"[l]iberty presum[ing] an autonomy of self," and of legal prohibitions 
of same-sex sodomy "involv[ing] liberty of the person both in its 
spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions. "59 
53. For a more thorough treatment of intra-Court dynamics in Glucksberg, see 
Devins, supra note 22, at 338-44. 
54. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 730-35 (referencing the sensibility of a state ban 
on assisted suicide). 
55. 539 u.s. 558 (2003). 
56. See id. 
57. See id. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion did not 
"describe homosexual sodomy as a 'fundamental right' or a 'fundamental liberty 
interest' "). 
58. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (citation omitted). 
59. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. Lawrence, moreover, looked beyond American history 
and norms to European Court of Justice interpretations of the European Convention of 
Human Rights. /d. at 573. For these and other reasons, commentators on both the left 
and right think that Lawrence "shatters" Chief Justice Rehnquist's efforts to use 
G/ucksberg to cabin substantive due process. See Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis, 
Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1573-75 (2004) 
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Likewise, Kennedy's decision paid scant attention to another 
opinion that he helped author, the plurality opinion in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.fiJ Casey spoke 
broadly about the key role that stare decisis plays in the American 
legal system and set forth an elaborate test to assess whether Roe v. 
Wade should be reaffirmed.61 In Lawrence, the Court made no 
reference to the Casey test in explaining why it thought Bowers was 
wrongly decided.62 Instead, Kennedy's opinion refers to another 
aspect of Casey-the plurality's conclusion that "[a]t the heart of 
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."63 
It is telling that Kennedy saw no reason to struggle over apparent 
inconsistencies with his Lawrence decision and the methodology he 
embraced in both Glucksberg and Casey. It is almost certainly true 
that Kennedy agreed with the outcomes in those decisions and did 
not want to disavow them. And if other Justices in the Lawrence 
majority disapproved of those decisions, their support of Kennedy's 
expansive language in Lawrence was sufficiently strong that they did 
not want to back Kennedy into a corner (by demanding, for example, 
that he disavow Glucksberg) or otherwise call attention to 
inconsistencies in Kennedy's jurisprudence (by filing a concurring 
opinion). For these Justices, it was enough for Kennedy to ignore 
(condemning Lawrence's lawlessness); Robert C. Post, Fashioning the Legal Constitution: 
Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 106 (2003) (celebrating Lawrence). 
60. 505 u.s. 833 (1992). 
61. See id. at 854-55. Although concluding that Roe should be reaffirmed, the Court 
determined that the trimester standard embraced by Roe should be jettisoned in favor of 
the so-called "undue burden" standard. See id. at 873-74. The Court also overturned 
decisions relying on the trimester standard, concluding that the trimester standard 
impermissibly limited state authority over abortion. See id. For critiques of Casey 
(suggesting, among other things, that it endorsed a makeshift, results-oriented approach to 
stare decisis), see Gerard V. Bradley, Is the Constitution Whatever the Winners Say It Is?, 
in THAT EMINENT TRIBUNAL: JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND THE CONSTITUTION 10, 10-
19 (Christopher Wolfe ed., 2004) [hereinafter EMINENT TRIBUNAL]; Robert F. Nagel, 
Nationhood and Judicial Supremacy, in EMINENT TRIBUNAL, supra, at 20, 20-36; and 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 995 (2005). Likewise, there is reason to doubt the sincerity of the Rehnquist 
Court's embrace of precedent in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
Although upholding Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1996), the Rehnquist Court 
severely gutted Miranda both before and after Dickerson . See Yale Kamisar, Dickerson v. 
United States: The Case That Disappointed Miranda 's Critics-And Then Its Supporters, 
in THE REHNQUIST LEGACY, supra note 13, at 106. 
62. In his Lawrence dissent, Justice Scalia remarked that the Court did not even 
"bother to distinguish-or indeed, even bother to mention-[Casey's] paean to stare 
decisis." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 587 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
63. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
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disfavored decisions Gust as it was enough for Justice Kennedy that 
Chief Justice Rehnquist ignored Bowers when writing Glucksberg).64 
The other telling feature of Kennedy's opinion is its sweeping 
language about the "transcendent dimensions" of "liberty," about 
"[f]reedom extend[ing] beyond spatial bounds."65 This language, 
"like many of his opinions, was written to be quoted, not analyzed."66 
Reflecting both his intense interest in how his decisions are perceived 
and his "expansive view of the courts' role in public life,"67 Kennedy 
was far more interested in "throwing down moral thunderbolts" than 
in following past precedent (even his own).68 
In sharp contrast, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in 
Lawrence broke no doctrinal ground. Reflecting her tendency "to 
focus on the particulars of the dispute before the Court" and to 
embrace "rationales on which diverse people can agree,"69 Justice 
O'Connor argued that the Texas law was grounded in an 
impermissible purpose ("moral disapproval" of gays) and, 
consequently, there was no need to revisit Bowers.70 In other words, 
just as she had carved out a palliative care exception in Glucksberg, 
O'Connor resisted Kennedy's expansive reasoning-preferring, 
instead, a "flexible," "context-specific" approach.71 In this way, 
64. See generally Chris W. Bonneau et al., Agenda Control, the Median Justice, and the 
Majority Opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 891 (2007) (focusing on 
the discretion that other Justices give to a Supreme Court Justice tasked with writing a 
majority opinion). I also think it seems likely that Senior Associate Justice John Paul 
Stevens assigned Lawrence to Kennedy precisely because Kennedy was willing to write an 
expansive ruling, making use of substantive due process to invalidate the Texas sodomy 
law. 
65. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
66. MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED 178 (2005) (discussing Kennedy's 
"pomposity" in the flag-burning decision). For a similar critique of Lawrence, see Lund & 
McGinnis, supra note 59, at 1575. 
67. JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT 160 (2007); see also 
TUSHNET, supra note 66, at 176 (noting a former Kennedy clerk once told Jeffrey Rosen 
about Kennedy's seeming obsession with "how it's going to be perceived, how the papers 
are going to do it, how it's going to look"). 
68. Edward Lazarus, The Pivotal Role of Justice Anthony Kennedy, FINDLAW'S 
WRIT, Aug. 3, 2003, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/lazarus/20030803.html. For a similar 
critique of Kennedy's 2007 decision in the partial-birth abortion case, see Charles Fried, 
Op-Ed., Supreme Confusion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,2006, at A25. 
69. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minima/ism, 58 STAN. L. REV.l899, 1907 (2006). 
70. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor had 
joined Bowers (not to mention Glucksberg), and I think she had little interest in admitting 
error in prior decisions. 
71. TUSHNET, supra note 66, at 54 (quoting favorably from NANCY MAVEETY, 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: STRATEGIST ON THE SUPREME COURT 31 (1996)). 
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O'Connor kept her options open.72 A subsequent case could always 
be distinguished on factual grounds, so that (unlike Kennedy) there 
was no need for O'Connor to play fast and loose with precedent. 
Correspondingly, by filing concurring opinions, O'Connor made clear 
that she would not be constrained by the reasoning employed in the 
majority opinion.73 
3. Final Thoughts on the Rehnquist Court 
Throughout his tenure as Chief Justice, William Rehnquist 
presided over a sharply divided, incoherent Court. Without a solid 
coalition of five (or more) ideologically simpatico Justices, the 
Rehnquist Court did not "make a single move that would radically 
change or unsettle existing constitutional doctrine."74 Instead, the 
confluence of decisionmaking styles on the Rehnquist Court was a 
perfect storm for the making of an incoherent Court. Leading (so to 
speak) the Court was a pragmatic Chief Justice uninterested in an 
" 'overarching substantive theory of constitutional interpretation' " 
and willing to sacrifice doctrinal coherence in order to cobble 
together a five member majority.75 More significant, two radically 
different "swing" Justices typically cast the deciding votes in key 
cases-one of whom was a minimalist (whose fact-specific 
decisionmaking did not bind her or the other Justices in subsequent 
cases); and the other of whom was quite willing to make expansive 
statements about doctrine and the judicial role (but felt neither bound 
by those principles in subsequent cases nor obligated to contemplate 
72. Mark Tushnet, in criticizing O'Connor, put it this way: "A reader [of O'Connor's 
opinions) could know what mattered to [her), but often not why it mattered so much--or 
so little. " /d. 
73. On O'Connor's propensity to file concurring opinions, see NANCY MAVEETY, 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: STRATEGIST ON THE SUPREME COURT 52-68 
{1996); and Richard Brust, Balancing Act: Her Constitutional Tests and Strategic 
Concurrences Helped Make Sandra Day O 'Connor a Force from the Center, A.B.A. J., 
Sept. 2005, at 37, 41. For an extreme example of this practice, see Bush v. Vera , 517 U.S. 
952 {1996), in which Justice O'Connor filed a concurrence to a decision that she authored. 
See id. at 990-95 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Jeffrey Rosen, Sandramandered, 
NEW REPUBLIC, July 8, 1996, at 6, 6 (condemning O'Connor's "analytically unintelligible" 
"contortions"). 
74. Lawrence Friedman, The Rehnquist Court: Some More or Less Historical 
Comments, in THE REHNQUIST COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 146 {Martin Belsky ed., 
2002); see also supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text. 
75. Rosen, supra note 40, at 87 (quoting Jack Goldsmith); see also supra Part I.A.l 
{discussing Rehnquist's willingness to trade off doctrinal coherence for a five-Justice 
majority in Glucksberg); infra note 77 and accompanying text. 
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precedents at odds with his decisionmaking).76 This mix of 
personalities, as the above discussion reveals, was on full display in 
Glucksberg and Lawrence. 
The Rehnquist Court, while unique in some respects, exemplifies 
the tendencies of incoherent Courts. Besides the individual 
preferences of the swing Justices, there are other structural 
explanations for why an incoherent Court would be less likely to issue 
broad opinions or overrule landmark precedents. In order to cobble 
together a majority coalition, Justices will often compromise their 
individual preferences regarding the reach of the decision.77 As a 
result, the "Justices will often deliberately cloud their opinion to 
obtain the fifth vote" "so long as the ambiguity is not incompatible 
with their views."78 
On an incoherent Court, there are more closely divided cases 
and, as a result, more opportunities for Justices in the majority to 
make compromises in order to hold together a majority coalition. In 
particular, there are more occasions when Justices will ask the 
decision writer to address their concerns through addition or deletion 
and "tacitly threaten to withhold support if the changes are not 
made."79 And when the opinion is being written by a swing Justice, it 
may be that other members of the majority coalition place fewer 
demands on the opinion writer-for fear that the swing Justice will 
drop out of the majority and file a special concurring opinion.80 
Against this backdrop, it is to be expected that the decisions of 
76. The question of what animated Justices O'Connor and Kennedy is beyond the 
scope of this Article. For a sampling of literature discussing the predelictions of Justices 
Kennedy and O'Connor, see supra notes 66-73, infra notes 242-45. See generally TOOBIN, 
supra note 31 (sharing various anecdotal and personal insights into the Justices of the 
Supreme Court). 
77. See generally Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 521 
(1998) (reviewing EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 6) (discussing then-Justice Rehnquist's 
"negotiating with John Stevens for a considerable time in order to produce a fifth vote" in 
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976)). In the case of a coherent Court, the 
final decision may not reflect the preferences of individual Justices in the majority 
coalition. Instead, these Justices may simply defer to the opinion writer. See Bonneau et 
al., supra note 64, at 903. At the same time, Justices in the majority coalition of a coherent 
Court are both more likely to agree with each other and, therefore, are less likely to 
condition their vote on the inclusion or exclusion of certain language from the majority 
opinion. This is not to say that bargaining does not take place on a coherent Court; it is to 
say that there is less bargaining than one might expect. See id. at 892. 
78. See Igor Kirman, Standing Apart To Be a Part: The Precedential Value of Supreme 
Court Concurring Opinions, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2099 (1995). 
79. Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting 
Fluidity on the Burger Court, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 581,581 (1996). 
80. See supra notes 56-68 and accompanying text (discussing Kennedy's opinion in 
Lawrence). 
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incoherent Courts will be in tension with each other-the rationales 
employed are not necessarily embraced by a majority of Justices, 
often muddied by compromise, and cases often turn on factual 
distinctions (because the legal rule is not intended to bind the Court 
in subsequent cases). This is certainly true of Rehnquist Court 
substantive due process decisions, but it is also true in the Court's 
decisions on religion, race, and its once-vaunted federalism revival.81 
One final comment about the Rehnquist Court and, more 
generally, incoherent Courts: while such Courts are reluctant to 
overturn landmark precedents, stare decisis does not operate as a 
significant independent constraint. When convenient, stare decisis is 
invoked as a rationale for not overturning precedent. Rehnquist 
Court decisions upholding Roe and Miranda v. Arizona,82 for 
example, are paeans to precedent.83 At the same time, the very 
Justices who wrote these opinions did not blink when overturning 
some abortion rulings or gutting much of Miranda's protections.84 
Likewise, some Justices (most notably Anthony Kennedy) ignore 
precedents-even stare decisis precedents-that stand in the way of 
preferred outcomes and rationales.85 None of this is to say that 
precedent does not figure into the Justices' deliberation or thinking;86 
rather, it is to say that the reluctance of incoherent Courts to overturn 
landmark precedents is tied more to the lack of consensus on these 
Courts than to the saliency of stare decisis. 
81. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. See generally TUSHNET, supra note 
66, at 223-48. 
82. 384 u.s. 436 (1966). 
83. See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
(upholding Roe); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (upholding Miranda). 
The Court also embraced its power to make and overrule precedent. For example, when 
invalidating congressional efforts to overturn Supreme Court decisionmaking through the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Court emphasized both its power to interpret the 
Constitution and the need for Congress to adhere to such Court interpretations. See City 
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1996). 
84. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (repudiating the trimester test utilized in Roe and, in so 
doing, overturning earlier Court decisions protecting abortion rights); see also Kamisar, 
supra note 61, at 106 (describing tension between the Rehnquist Court's gutting of 
Miranda and the lopsided (seven to two) rejection of congressional efforts to statutorily 
overrule Miranda). 
85. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court's Current Doctrine of Stare 
Decisis Require Adherence to the Supreme Court's Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 
N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1168-200 (2008) (discussing incoherence of stare decisis methodology 
employed in Casey); supra notes 56--68 and accompanying text. 
86. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 6, at 28-33 (discussing the Justices' invocation 
of precedent in their deliberations). 
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B. The Early Warren Court 
There were two Warren Courts. The 1962-1968 Terms were, as 
Lucas Powe put it, "history's Warren Court."87 That Court, as Part II 
will detail, was a coherent Court willing both to overturn precedent 
and make significant doctrinal advances. The 1953-1961 Terms tell a 
far different story. The Court rarely overturned precedent (eleven 
during this period) and was sharply divided.88 Justices Potter Stewart 
and Tom Clark generally alternated as the swing Justices for much of 
this period.89 But on national security cases, which dominated much 
of this period, Justices Felix Frankfurter and John Marshall Harlan 
cast the decisive votes.90 
The national security cases are emblematic of the early Warren 
Court. Rather than embrace a "hard" view of the Constitution, the 
Court made extensive use of constitutional avoidance-permitting 
the Justices to initially rule in favor of Communists and other 
subversives while allowing themselves the freedom to change their 
minds in subsequent cases. And Justices Frankfurter and Harlan did 
change their minds-responding to congressional opprobrium by 
backing away from their initial pro-civil liberties rulings. 
Minimalist decisionmaking also characterizes the two most 
significant constitutional rulings of the early Warren Court-Brown 
v. Board of Education91 and Baker v. Carr.cn In both Brown and 
Baker, the Court declared an important principle without ordering 
consequential relief. Baker rejected political question objections to 
legislative apportionment cases-but left the details of the substantive 
doctrine to subsequent cases. Brown, although repudiating separate-
but-equal, left it to southern school systems to devise appropriate 
remedies (and the Warren Court subsequently denied certiorari in 
related challenges to state antimiscegenation laws).93 As a result, the 
most consequential statements about school desegregation and 
legislative apportionment were made by the post-1962 Warren 
87. POWE, supra note 1, at 209, 497-99. 
88. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. 
89. See generally Steven Smith, Justices Stewart and Clark: Swing Votes on the Warren 
Court, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1009 (1979) (discussing swings from 1958--1960). 
90. See Frickey, supra note 18, at 401-02. 
91. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (effectively overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896)). 
92. 369 U.S. 186 (1962), overruling Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
93. See Nairn v. Nairn, 350 U.S. 885 (1956). For the classic statement of why the Court 
had good reason to steer clear of antimiscegenation, see ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 46--60 (1986). 
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Court.94 Likewise, it was the post-1962 Warren Court95 that issued 
definitive constitutional rulings on antisubversive legislation and, in 
so doing, provided expansive civil liberties protections to Communists 
and other critics of the government.96 
1. Red Monday and Its Aftermath97 
During its 1956-1957 Term, the Court decided twelve cases 
involving Communists, ruling against the government in every case.98 
Most significant, on June 17, 1957 (Red Monday), the Court handed 
down four decisions that severely limited Smith Act prosecutions (for 
the "knowing or willing" "advocacy or teaching" of the "desirability 
or propriety of overthrowing the Government of the United 
States").99 These decisions, while signaling the unconstitutionality of 
governmental efforts to clamp down on subversives, were decided on 
statutory grounds.10° For example, in Yates v. United States/01 the 
Court (in an opinion by Justice Harlan) concluded that the Smith Act 
was limited to "incitement" and did not extend to abstract 
advocacy.102 
Congress responded with a vengeance, coming-as Chief Justice 
Warren put it-"dangerously close" to enacting legislation that would 
94. See POWE, supra note 1, at 239-71 (detailing post-1962 reapportionment cases); 
Neal Devins, The Judicial Role in Equality Decisionmaking, in REDEFINING EQUALITY 
219, 221 (Neal Devins & Davison M. Douglas eds., 1998) (discussing the sharp divide 
between pre- and post-1962 Warren Court school desegregation decisions). For additional 
discussion of the pre-post 1962 divide in legislative reapportionment, see THE AMERICAN 
CONGRESS: THE BUILDING OF DEMOCRACY 551-53 (Julian E. Zelizer ed., 2004). See 
also infra Part II.A. 
95. See infra Part II.A. 
96. See Frickey, supra note 18, at 426-39. For this very reason, Walter Murphy 
described the Warren Court's earlier retreat on anti-Communist legislation as a "tactical 
withdrawal, not a rout." WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT: A CASE 
STUDY IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS 246 (1962). 
97. The discussion draws from Neal Devins, Should the Court Fear Congress?, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1342-43 (2006). In that prior essay, I argued that the Court had good 
reason to fear congressional retaliation. See id. at 1348-58. The following analysis 
represents a partial rethinking of my position in that prior paper. Here I make a 
somewhat different argument-emphasizing that the Justices who switched positions in 
anti-Communist cases had weak policy preferences. Cf. id. 
98. POWE, supra note 1, at 90-91 (summarizing cases dealing with Communism during 
the 1956-1957 Term). 
99. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2000) (criminalizing the "knowing or willing ... advocacy or 
teaching ... [of the] desirability or propriety of overthrowing the Government of the 
United States"). 
100. See generally Frickey, supra note 18 (describing the early Warren Court's 
constitutional avoidance tendencies). 
101. 354 u.s. 298 (1957). 
102. /d. at 313. 
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have stripped the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction in five 
domestic security areas. 103 The Court relented, issuing decisions that 
limited the scope of earlier rulings and otherwise permitted the 
government to prosecute subversive cases. 104 In Barenblatt v. United 
States,105 for example, the Court (in a quite different Harlan opinion) 
upheld a six-month contempt-of-Congress sentence for a witness's 
refusal to answer questions before the House Un-American Activities 
Committee.106 Concluding that personal liberties must be balanced 
against pressing public needs, the Court backed away from Yates and 
other Red Monday decisions. The fact that the Court did this after 
the defeat of proposed jurisdiction-stripping measures was significant, 
prompting The New York Times, for example, to complain that "what 
Senator Jenner [the principal sponsor of court-stripping legislation] 
was unable to achieve [in Congress] the Supreme Court has now 
virtually accomplished on its own. "107 
The New York Times had good reason to highlight the curious 
timing of the Court's retreat. At the same time, the retreat was 
hardly that of the entire Court, which was sharply divided on national 
security cases. Pro-civil liberties cases in the 1956-1957 Term were 
often decided by a vote of five to four. Following the Court's retreat, 
the Court was again divided, often deciding cases five to four. 108 The 
real retreat, in other words, was the work of the Court's centrist 
Justices-John Marshall Harlan and especially Felix Frankfurter.109 
Consider, for example, Justice Frankfurter: from 1959-1962, he cast 
only one dissenting vote on a national security case (and that case was 
"nonconsequential, nonconstitutional").110 
103. EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 313 {1977). 
104. See THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY 48-
66 {2004) {discussing the Court's retreat and the related scholarly debate about the 
Court's role in checking governmental excess); POWE, supra note 1, at 235-56. 
105. 360 u.s. 109 {1959) 
106. /d. at 134. 
107. MURPHY, supra note 96, at 245 (quoting Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1960, at 
36:1). 
108. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Decisional Trends on the Warren and 
Burger Courts: Results from the Supreme Court Data Base Project, 73 JUDICATURE 103, 
104 ("[A] vote of 5-4 decided 23 of the 52 non-unanimous civil liberties decisions."). 
109. See Frickey, supra note 18, at 432-37. 
110. POWE, supra note 1, at 142. For this and other reasons, Frankfurter was described 
as the leader of the Court's cautious wing. See William Eskridge, Civil Rights Legislation 
in the 1990s: Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights 
Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 619 n.28 {1991); see also infra note 117 and accompanying text 
(discussing Frankfurter's judicial philosophy). 
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2. Constitutional Avoidance and the External Strategic Actor 
In theory, a strategic, policy-oriented Court might make use of 
constitutional avoidance in ways quite similar to the pre-1962 Warren 
Court. For example, recognizing potential political backlash to pro-
Communist rulings, the Court might have used avoidance to return 
the issue to Congress. In particular, if Congress did not countermand 
the Court, the Justices would understand that they could be more 
aggressive in their pursuit of favored policies-grounding their 
decisions in the Constitution and thereby making it harder for 
Congress (through legislation) and future Courts (through statutory 
interpretation) to advance a competing policy agenda. In contrast, if 
their decisions did prompt a legislative backlash, the Court could beat 
a strategic retreat. It could defuse congressional backlash by 
interpreting subsequent statutes in ways that lawmakers supported 
(and hold off on reaching the constitutional questions until the 
political climate was more favorable). 
The question remains: was the Warren Court's retreat strategic? 
My past writings argued that the 1957 Warren Court had reason to 
fear Congress-and that it would have been sensible for a "strategic" 
Justice to take into account Court-curbing proposals.lll Whether or 
not this earlier analysis is correct, such strategic behavior played little 
or no role in explaining the Court's retreat. Instead, the Warren 
Court's flip-flop speaks more to the pre-1962 Warren Court's 
incoherence than anything else. 
To start, a Justice truly committed to the policy goals of 1956-
1957 Term civil liberties decisions would have run the risk that 
Congress would strike back at the Court. This explains the 
willingness of Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Warren to 
oppose the Court's retreat-often filing vociferous dissents.112 In 
particular, the 1960 Court had reason to think that Congress would 
acquiesce to pro-civil liberties rulings. Earlier Court-curbing 
proposals failed, and the Court controversy was not a major factor in 
the 1958 elections. 113 More significantly, "the Congress became more 
liberal. Seven Republican Senators who had battled the Court, 
111. See Devins, supra note 97, at 1343-44; see also MURPHY, supra note 96, at 246 
(defending the Court's retreat as "tactical"); Frickey, supra note 18, at 431-32 (describing 
the Court's reaction to Congressional criticism). 
112. See KECK, supra note 104, at 53-54 (discussing Justice Black's dissent in 
Barenblatt and Black's subsequent public statements about the failings of the Harlan-
Frankfurter balancing test). 
113. Frickey, supra note 18, at 431. 
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including Jenner, .. . had left due either to retirement or electoral 
defeat." 114 
But for Justice Frankfurter (and presumably his ally, Justice 
Harlan),115 the hue and cry following the Court's 1956--1957 Term 
rulings was too much. Not only did Congress seek to slap the Court 
down, the American Bar Association and Judge Learned Hand 
launched sharp attacks against the Court.116 Frankfurter was a pro-
government New Dealer who sought to limit judicial intrusions into 
the legislative process by advancing any number of "judicial restraint" 
doctrines.117 His antigovernment decisions were a departure from this 
norm and, as such, there is reason to think that he was not strongly 
committed to the civil liberties agenda championed by Black, 
Douglas, Warren, and Brennan. By retreating from 1956-1957 Term 
decisions and returning to his typical mode of decisionmaking, he was 
able to demonstrate his bona fides to Court criticsY8 
To summarize, the Court's retreat from 1956--1957 Term rulings 
is not a story of a Court acting strategically-by issuing minimalist 
nonconstitutional decisions in an effort to best assess how to advance 
its pro-civil liberties agenda. Instead, the Harlan/Frankfurter flip and 
the vociferous criticism of that flip by pro-civil liberties Justices 
speaks to divergent preferences on an incoherent Court. Frankfurter 
and Harlan had weak preferences and, as such, were not truly aligned 
with the Court's four liberals (Warren, Douglas, Black, and 
Brennan). That Frankfurter and Harlan preferred nonconstitutional 
decisions in the 1956--1957 Term speaks to those weak preferences; 
114. /d. (citing MURPHY, supra note 96, at 237-38). 
115. On the allegiance between Harlan and Frankfurter, see KECK, supra note 104, at 
53 (describing Harlan as Frankfurter's "closest ally"); and POWE, supra note 1, at 143 
(describing Harlan as "closely associated" with Frankfurter, pointing to a Harlan opinion 
as "Frankfurter lite"). 
116. See POWE, supra note 1, at 127-34; Frickey, supra note 18, at 431-32. 
117. Frankfurter was known for deference to elected officials, state judges, and 
Congress; he was not known for engaging issues on a constitutional level (another reason 
why Frankfurter would have been predisposed to making use of avoidance in lieu of 
constitutional rulings). 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 389-90 (Thomas 
T. Lewis & Richard L. Wilson eds., 2001). Correspondingly, Frankfurter believed that 
mores and police power were the proper locus of power and, as such, he was especially 
upset when allegations of judicial activism were levied against the Warren Court (another 
reason why Frankfurter would have been especially sensitive to the criticisms of the bar, 
Congress, and Judge Hand). See id. 
118. For a treatment of the desire of Justices to seek approval from "audiences" that 
matter to them, see generally LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A 
PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006). See also id. at 42, 44 (noting Learned 
Hand's influence on Frankfurter, as well as Frankfurter's desire to portray himself as a 
civil libertarian committed to judicial restraint). 
HeinOnline -- 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1421 2007-2008
2008] IDEOLOGICAL COHESION AND PRECEDENT 1421 
their willingness to flip in response to anti-Court criticism by 
Congress, the bar, and respected jurists also speaks to those weak 
preferences.119 
Finally, there is a link between the discussions of the Rehnquist 
and early Warren Courts. Just as the Justices on the Rehnquist Court 
compromised with each other in order to piece together five-member 
majority coalitions, the early Warren Court likewise compromised in 
the first round of antisubversive cases. Unable to get five Justices 
willing to strike down governmental conduct on constitutional 
grounds, the "divided and besieged set of Justices avoided the 
sharpest confrontations with each other by agreeing to issue 
indeterminate opinions."120 These decisions, in other words, 
announced results and did not make law. The Court's swing Justices 
could peel away from the pro-civil liberties coalition without 
admitting error. Equally telling is that following the 
Frankfurter/Harlan flip, the Court's four liberals-no longer needing 
to compromise with the swing Justices-could now issue strongly 
worded dissents, dissents that reveal that this group of Justices 
formed an ideologically simpatico coalition. For the Warren Court, 
as the next part will detail, 1962 proved to be the defining year. Felix 
Frankfurter retired and Arthur Goldberg took his seat; this change in 
the Court's composition was transforming. No longer incoherent, the 
Court could aggressively pursue a coherent vision of the law. 
II. COHERENT COURTS 
The post-1962 Warren and New Deal (1937-1949) Courts 
exemplify coherent Courts. Five or more Justices on these Courts 
were ideologically simpatico and pursued a shared vision of legal 
policymaking. Sometimes that meant overturning landmark 
constitutional precedents; sometimes that meant embracing novel 
legal doctrines. The post-1962 Warren Court overturned thirty-two 
constitutional precedents in the 1962-1968 Terms (thirty of which 
119. In arguing that the Court did not act strategically, I am not making the stronger 
claim that strategic concerns did not figure into the calculus of any Justice. For example, 
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan may well have seen their flip as a mechanism for the 
Court to improve relationships with Congress. At the same time, these Justices were less 
interested in advancing a pro-civil liberties agenda than were the Court's four liberals. 
Frankfurter, in particular, was a strong proponent of judicial restraint. See KECK, supra 
note 104, at 38-66. Thinking that the Court should only invalidate laws that 
"unambiguous[ly)" violated the Constitution, Frankfurter regularly put his views of the 
judicial role in front of his preferred policy outcomes. /d. at 45. In this way, Frankfurter's 
approach to judging does not jibe with the policy-driven strategic actor model. 
120. Frickey, supra note 18, at 401. 
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advanced liberal outcomes).121 The Warren Court, moreover, 
advanced its nationalistic agenda through a series of doctrinal 
innovations---constitutionalizing criminal procedure and 
fundamentally revamping the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The New Deal Court overturned thirty-two decisions from 1937-1946 
(nearly all of which advanced the New Deal Court's embrace of 
economic regulation ).122 By freeing the government's hand to 
regulate economic matters, moreover, the New Deal Court 
transformed the work of the Supreme Court-moving it away from 
economic issues and towards civil rights and liberties. Consider, for 
example, the 1935 Term (immediately before the start of the New 
Deal Court). Unlike the modern era, the 1935 Court heard only two 
(out of 160) cases that implicated civil rights and liberties.123 
In explaining post-1962 Warren and New Deal Court 
decisionmaking, this Article both provides some details of ideological 
cohesion among the Justices of these two Courts and takes a closer 
look at an exemplary decision from each Court. For the Warren 
Court, this Article looks at Miranda-a case that showcased the 
Warren Court's willingness to hand down prophylactic rules that 
looked more like statutes than judicial edicts. For the New Deal 
Court, it discusses Wickard v. Filburn, 124 a case in which the Court 
self-consciously abandoned its authority to check Congress's 
Commerce Clause powers. 
A. The Second Warren Court 
"History's Warren Court," the Court that "virtually rewrote the 
corpus of our constitutional law," began with the 1962 appointment of 
Arthur Goldberg.125 In sharp contrast to Felix Frankfurter (the 
Justice whose seat Goldberg filled), Goldberg was self-consciously 
121. Ringhand, supra note 16, at 1075-77. Likewise, from 1962-1968, sixty-six state 
statutes were invalidated. Sixty-two of these invalidations advanced liberal outcomes. /d. 
at 1058-61. 
122. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 213-36 (1995); see also 
Christopher P. Banks, The Supreme Court and Precedent: An Analysis of Natural Courts 
and Reversal Trends, 75 JUDICATURE 262,265-66 (1992); infra Part II.B (discussing other 
measures of the New Deal Court's willingness to overturn precedent). 
123. LEUCHENTBURG, supra note 122, at 235. 
124. 317 u.s. 111 (1942). 
125. MICHAEL BELKNAP, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN 1953-69, at 
308 (2005) (quoting THE BURGER COURT: COUNTER REVOLUTION OR 
CONFIRMATION? 261 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1998)). 
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liberal and activist. 126 Together with Warren, Douglas, Black, and 
Brennan, Goldberg gave the Court five secure votes for liberal 
outcomes. Goldberg (and Abe Fortas, the Justice who replaced 
Goldberg in 1966) agreed with Warren about ninety percent of the 
time, and the intra-agreement rate among the five liberals likewise 
hovered around ninety percent. 127 When Thurgood Marshall joined 
the Court in 1967 (replacing Tom Clark), the Court moved even 
further to the left.128 Marshall was in the majority ninety-five percent 
of the time (second only to Brennan who was in the majority ninety-
eight percent of the time), and the intra-agreement rate among "the 
most cohesive bloc in modern Court history" (Fortas, Warren, 
Brennan, and Marshall) was near ninety-three percent.129 
Ideological cohesion within the Warren Court played out in 
innumerable ways. More than any Court before it, the Warren Court 
was willing to overturn constitutional precedent.13° Correspondingly, 
the Warren Court was not especially concerned with the niceties of 
doctrinal consistency; instead, it was much more focused on reaching 
preferred outcomes. Mark Tushnet describes this as the "willfulness" 
of the Court: its willingness to reach the "correct" result even when 
the "doctrinal tools ... were not readily at hand."131 For example, 
rather than engage in a high-minded debate about whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights, the Warren 
Court thought it good public policy to mandate that the states be 
subject to the same Bill of Rights limits as the federal government. It 
did not "bother[] to come up with a decent theory supporting [this 
conclusion], because the Warren Court's members were not 
concerned with constitutional theory."132 Perhaps for this reason, the 
126. POWE, supra note 1, at 211-12. On the question of whether 1961 or 1962 is the 
critical year, see supra note 1. See also Kermit L. Hall, The Warren Court: Yesterday, 
Today, and Tomorrow, 28 IND. L. REV. 309, 312 (1995) (suggesting that there was 
"ideological continuity" throughout the Warren era). 
127. POWE, supra note 1, at 212. A more empirically minded study places the 
agreement rate among Warren, Goldberg, Brennan, and Douglas near eighty-seven 
percent. See Edward V. Heck, Justice Brennan and the Heyday of Warren Court 
Liberalism, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 841,845 (1980). 
128. Eskridge, supra note 110, at 619-20 n.28. 
129. Heck, supra note 127, at 872; see also POWE, supra note 1, at 290. Justice 
Douglas-who had a propensity to file lone dissents-regularly voted for liberal outcomes 
but had a lower intra-agreement score. Heck, supra note 127, at 872. 
130. BELKNAP, supra note 125, at 308. 
131. Tushnet, supra note 1, at 10. 
132. !d. at 18. Tushnet's conclusion is shared by both supporters and opponents of 
Warren Court innovations. Consider, for example, Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1965). Robert Bork condemned Griswold for its lawlessness, arguing that it-like many 
other Warren Court decisions-"fail[ed] every test of neutrality" and, as such, the decision 
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Warren Court saw little reason to ground their doctrinal innovations 
in past precedent and, as such, cited fewer precedents than other 
Supreme Courts.133 
The ideological coherence (and corresponding ambitiousness) of 
the Warren Court is also reflected in the ways in which the Court 
pursued its policymaking agenda. The Court rewrote constitutional 
law and, in critical respects, the Court was more ambitious in 
pursuing its liberal agenda than were Congress and the White House 
(even during the Johnson administration, when Democrats controlled 
both Congress and the White House). The key to all this was Earl 
Warren who, as Bernard Schwartz observed, "strongly believed that 
the law must draw its vitality from life rather than precedent" and 
that the Court needed "to perform a transforming role, usually 
thought of as more appropriate to the legislator than the judge" in 
order for the Court "to keep step with the twentieth century's frenetic 
pace of social change."134 In particular, Warren and the dominant 
coalition on the post-1962 Court aggressively pursued the 
nationalization of political problems and processes, especially 
equality for the underrepresented (minorities, the poor, the accused, 
and children).135 In so doing, the Court opened up areas that had 
"been thought closed to the exercise of judicial power,"136 often 
"articulating broad rules that went well beyond the particular 
circumstances of individual cases."137 
Consider, for example, the ways in which the post-1962 Warren 
Court extended the doctrinal innovations of the pre-1962 Warren 
Court. In Brown, the pre-1962 Court declared a basic principle but 
then left it to southern school systems to sort out how to put that 
was an "unprincipled" effort of the Justices to impose their value choices on elected 
officials. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L.J. 1, 9 (1971). Defenders of the Warren Court's reinvigoration of the right to 
privacy are also critical of the Court's reasoning. Most significant (and consistent with 
Mark Tushnet's claim about the Court's interest in getting to "yes"-and not worrying 
about constitutional theory), David Garrow's review of the Justices' internal deliberations 
revealed that several Warren Court Justices were searching for a theory to back their 
conclusion that Connecticut's ban on contraceptives was unconstitutional. DAVID J. 
GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY 245-50 (1994). 
133. See Fowler & Jeon, supra note 2, at 3, 7. 
134. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 275,263 (1993). 
135. See RICHARD Y. FuNSTON, CONSTITUTIONAL COUNTERREVOLUTION? 297-307 
(1977); see also sources cited in Kermit L. Hall, The Warren Court in Historical 
Perspective, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 293-95 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 
1996). 
136. FUNSTON, supra note 135, at 314. 
137. Barbara Palmer, Issue Fluidity and Agenda Setting on the Warren Court, 52 POL. 
REs. Q. 39, 42 (1999) (citation omitted). 
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principle into action. 138 "[O]ne decade after Brown, only [two 
percent] of black children attended biracial schools in the eleven 
southern states."139 In an effort to make the Brown decision 
consequential, the post-1962 Warren Court reentered the fray, 
declaring in 1964 that "[t]he time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run 
out"140 and rejecting, in 1968, freedom of choice plans that allowed 
white and African American students to opt into one-race schools.141 
Likewise, the post-1962 Court dramatically extended the reach of 
Baker v. Carr142 (which simply held justiciable legal challenges to 
legislative apportionment schemes). In Reynolds v. Sims, 143 the Court 
declared voting a fundamental right and established the "one person, 
one vote" principle.144 In so doing, the Court effectively put in issue 
"[ninety] percent of the districts in the House of Representatives .... 
[and] virtually every single seat in the upper houses of state 
legislatures and most of the seats in lower houses. "145 The decision 
was so far-reaching that Anthony Lewis, Supreme Court 
correspondent for The New York Times, observed that "[e]ven some 
liberal-minded persons, admirers of the modern Supreme Court, 
found themselves stunned. "146 
The Court's willingness to push the limits of earlier doctrinal 
innovations calls attention to another central feature of post-1962 
Warren Court decisionmaking. On the one hand, the Court was a 
product of its times. Elected government and the American people 
had become more liberal-so much so that some have argued that the 
post-1962 Warren Court became "politically in tune with the liberal 
changes that were about to sweep the country"147 and that "the Court 
138. See J. Harvie Wilkinson, The Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation, 
1955-1970: A History and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REV. 485 (1978) (discussing the South's 
response to Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the Court's decision to leave the 
implementation of Brown to Southern school officials and district court judges). 
139. Neal Devins, What Brown Teaches Us About the Rehnquist Court's Federalism 
Revival, PS: POL. SCI. & POL., Apr. 2004, at 212. 
140. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)). 
141. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968). 
142. 369 u.s. 186 (1962). 
143. 377 u.s. 533 (1964). 
144. /d. at 558. 
145. POWE, supra note 1, at 252; see also THE AMERICAN CONGRESS: THE BUILDING 
OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 94, at 549-51 (noting that Reynolds is a dramatic extension 
of Baker and attributing that extension to Goldberg's replacement of Frankfurter). 
146. Anthony Lewis, Supreme Court Moves Again To Exert Its Powerful Influence, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1964, at E3. 
147. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Bringing Politics Back In, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 309, 311 
(2000) (reviewing POWE, supra note 1). 
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was a functioning part of the Kennedy-Johnson liberalism of the mid-
and late-1960s."148 For example, Baker was universally applauded, 
and Congress backed Brown by enacting landmark civil rights 
legislation, most notably the Civil Rights Act of 1964.149 At the same 
time, the Court tested the limits of what elected government and the 
American people would tolerate. The post-1962 Warren Court's push 
towards numerical measures of racial equality in the schools, its "one 
person, one vote" standard, its constitutionalization of criminal law, 
and much more did not resonate with elected officials or the 
American people.150 Indeed, Richard Nixon and George Wallace's 
1968 presidential bids both took aim at Supreme Court liberalism.151 
As such, the post-1962 Warren Court's liberal majority was willing to 
run risks, "to be in tension with the dominant political culture."152 
The post-1962 Warren Court's willingness to test limits, to go as far as 
it could in advancing its vision of legal policymaking, is a hallmark of 
a coherent Court.153 
1. Goodbye Constitutional A voidance; Hello Prophylactic Rules 
If the hallmark of the first Warren Court was its use of 
constitutional avoidance in antisubversive cases, 154 the post-1962 
Warren Court demonstrated its willingness to impose a hard view of 
148. POWE, supra note 1, at 494. 
149. On Baker, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 85-86 (1990); and 
POWE, supra note 1, at 203-05. On the relationship between the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 
the Court's ruling in Brown, see Neal Devins, Judicial Matters, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 
1032-34 (1992) (reviewing GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS 
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991)). 
150. For example, the Warren Court also revolutionized the First Amendment-
liberalizing obscenity standards, limiting libel prosecutions, and striking down loyalty 
oaths. See POWE, supra note 1, at 303-21, 336-57. 
151. See William G. Ross, The Role of Judicial Issues in Presidential Campaigns, 42 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 391, 434-37 (2002) (concluding that "[j]udicial issues may have 
influenced the outcome of the 1968 election more than any other election in the nation's 
history"). 
152. Hall, supra note 126, at 327. 
153. In this way, the Warren Court was not especially interested in having a true 
dialogue with Congress. Instead, it pushed its agenda as far as it could go-seeking to 
avoid a legislative countermand but willing to craft doctrine in ways that did not match 
legislative preferences. See Neal Devins in Phillip P. Frickey et al., Congress and the Earl 
Warren Court, BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY 15-16 (Summer 2004), available 
at http://www.amacad.org/publicationslbulletin/summer2004/scheiber.pdf (examining the 
Court's willingness to use a Reconstruction-era civil rights statute to advance a broader 
vision of fair housing rights than the just-enacted fair housing legislation). This Article's 
conclusion notes this type of decisionmaking tracks one of the models of judicial 
decisionmaking advanced by political scientists, the external strategic actor. See supra 
note 11; see infra notes 158, 174. 
154. See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text. 
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legal policymaking by embracing prophylactic rules-rules intended 
to bind lower courts and government officials (even if it meant 
sometimes prohibiting otherwise constitutional behavior).155 This bit 
of constitutional bravado highlights the fundamental differences 
between pre- and post-1962 Warren Court decisionmaking. The post-
1962 Court knew its mind on legal policy questions and, as such, was 
willing to bind itself, lower courts, and government officials. 
Consequently, instead of invoking the avoidance canon when 
considering the legality of antisubversive legislation, the post-1962 
Warren Court "brought the domestic-security apparatus to a halt," 156 
declaring unconstitutional federal laws banning Communists from 
working in defense facilities and limiting the mailing of "communist 
propaganda." 157 More than that, the post-1962 Court was willing to 
risk elected-branch disapproval in order to advance their legal policy 
agenda.158 
Miranda v. Arizona is the quintessential example of the post-
1962 Warren Court's willingness to run risks and pursue its vision of 
legal policymaking. Notwithstanding public opinion polls showing 
significant opposition to post-1962 Warren Court criminal procedure 
decisions and the calls by twenty-seven states (in an amicus brief) for 
the Court to slow down its criminal procedure revolution,159 Miranda 
mandated a specific set of warnings that police must read to criminal 
suspects. 160 In so doing, the Court required every state to change its 
interrogation practices.161 More than that, the decision read like a 
legislative code, not a constitutional opinion. 162 Correspondingly, in 
155. See infra notes 159--{)6 and accompanying text. 
156. POWE, supra note 1, at 316. 
157. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263-M (1967); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 
381 u.s. 301, 306-07 (1965). 
158. The question remains: were the Justices simply voting their policy preferences or 
did they make a strategic decision to advance the law as far as they could without risking 
legislative override? Attitudinalists embrace the former view; the external strategic actor 
model embraces the latter view. Compare SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 6, at 86-97, with 
EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 6, at 9-18. For additional discussion, see infra note 174 
(discussing the criminal procedure scale back). 
159. POWE, supra note 1, at 394-95. 
160. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,473 (1966). 
161. Fowler & Jeon, supra note 2, at 29. For this reason, Miranda is described as 
"hands down" the post-1962 Warren Court's most controversial criminal procedure 
decision, if not " the most controversial decision by the Warren Court." POWE, supra note 
1, at 394. Measures of precedential salience likewise see Miranda as a defining decision 
for the post-1962 Warren Court. See Fowler & Jeon, supra note 2, at 28-29. 
162. See Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and 
the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL L.F. 518, 532 (describing Miranda as a "legislative-like 
directive[]"). 
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overturning the long-standing totality of the circumstances test, the 
Court gave "disproportionate attention" to matters of policy, not 
law.163 Among other things, the Court began by announcing a new 
rule "so specific that there could be no claim that [it] flowed directly 
from the text of the Constitution. "164 More striking, by embracing a 
prophylacti~ rule, 165 the Court concluded that it was better (as a 
matter of policy) to foreclose some constitutionally permissible 
interrogations in order to stop unconstitutional interrogations.166 
In understanding the Court's willingness to impose its views on 
elected officials and the police, defenders of Miranda highlight the 
"failure of other agencies of law to assume responsibility for 
regulating police practices. "167 Also, because of his experiences as 
Attorney General of California, Chief Justice Warren invested 
significant energy in constitutionalizing criminal procedure.168 From 
1958-1962, the Court decided fourteen criminal cases-ruling for the 
liberal bloc in only six of these cases.169 When Warren stepped down, 
over a fifth of the Court's docket consisted of criminal cases-with 
the post-1962 Warren Court regularly ruling in favor of criminal 
suspects.l1° For this very reason, we now "speak of 'constitutional 
criminal procedure' instead of simply 'criminal procedure.' "171 
The Warren Court's federalization of criminal procedure is a 
hallmark both to its legal policy agenda and to the ability of a 
coherent Court to advance such an agenda. A strong advocate for 
those who were poorly served by the political process, the Court 
163. G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 269 (1982). Likewise, John 
Marshall Harlan (one of the four dissenters in Miranda) expressed strong disapproval of 
the Court's handiwork. In the conference following oral arguments, he argued that the 
Court was "repudiating 'all our precedents and history,'" that the Court's " 'radical' 
innovation" should take place only after" 'more empirical data' "was assembled, and that 
the Court should " 'leave law reform to others.' " BELKNAP, supra note 125, at 245 
(quoting Justice Harlan). 
164. POWE, supra note 1, at 395. 
165. On the Warren Court's tendency to issue per se (or prophylactic) rules, see Allen, 
supra note 162, at 532; and Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The 
Uses and Limits of Prophylactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925, 932-39 (1999). 
166. See Landsberg, supra note 165, at 933-34. 
167. Anthony Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal 
Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785,790 (1970). 
168. Yale Kamisar, How Earl Warren's Twenty-Two Years in Law Enforcement 
Affected His Work as Chief Justice, in EARL WARREN AND THE WARREN COURT: THE 
LEGACY IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN LAW 91, 93-112 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 2007). 
169. Steven Smith, Justices Stewart and Clark: Swing Votes on the Warren Court, 19 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1009, 1025-26 (1979). 
170. Fowler & Jean, supra note 2, at 30. 
171. Steven F. Smith, Taking Lessons from the Left?: Judicial Activism on the Right, 1 
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 57, 59 (2002). 
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pursued doctrinal innovations to protect racial minorities, the poor, 
the accused, juveniles, religious minorities, political dissidents, and 
underrepresented voters. In so doing, the Court cared about 
results-not legal niceties (such as adhering to or even citing 
precedent). 172 More than that, the Court embraced politically 
unpopular targets.173 And after turning itself into an election issue, a 
majority coalition of five Justices-while scaling back on their 
controversial criminal procedure revolution174-nonetheless proved 
willing to risk elected-government backlash in order to pursue that 
which they thought was right.175 
172. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text. 
173. Consider, for example, the Court's nationalization of criminal procedure. Fred 
Graham wrote about the remarkable "coincidence in timing between the rise in crime, 
violence[,] and racial tensions ... and the Supreme Court's campaign to strengthen the 
rights of criminal suspects against the state." FRED GRAHAM, THE SELF INFLICfED 
WOUND 4 (1970). 
174. See Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice, in THE WARREN 
COURT: A RETROSPECfiVE, supra note 135, at 116-17 (suggesting a scale back in 
criminal procedure during the final two years of the Warren Court); see also Paul G. 
Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot: 18 U.S. C. § 3501 and the Overhauling of Miranda, 
85 IOWA L. REV. 175, 194-97 (1999) (discussing congressional efforts to override 
Miranda) . The willingness of the Warren Court to scale back its criminal procedure 
revolution suggests that the Justices were sensitive to possible elected branch reprisals 
and, as such, provides some support for the external strategic actor model. For additional 
discussion, see infra text accompanying note 224. 
175. The willingness of a coherent Court to take risks tracks the theory of groupthink. 
Most famously explored by Irving Janis, groupthink is characterized as the decisionmaking 
process that often takes place in highly cohesive groups such that individual members of 
the group fail to identify and explore alternative decisions that could be more rational or 
effective in order to avoid disrupting group cohesion. IRVING JANIS, VICfiMS OF 
GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS AND 
FIASCOS 9 (1972). This desire not to disrupt the group's general agreement can arise out 
of fear of angering other members of the group, or even fear of the possibility of 
embarrassment for voicing an unacceptable opinion. See id. at 3. Janis defined 
groupthink as follows: "A mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply 
involved in a cohesive in·group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their 
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action." /d. at 9. In the context 
of a cohesive Court, groupthink might be manifested in several ways. As already noted, 
Justices on a coherent Court are likely to vigorously pursue their shared ideological 
agenda-perhaps at the expense of exploring alternatives that are less likely to provoke a 
public outcry. Perhaps more significant, Justices on a coherent Court are more likely to 
defer to the views of the opinion writer-even if they would write a different opinion 
themselves. Specifically, Justices on a coherent Court, by definition, are part of a voting 
block of five or more Justices. Consequently, these Justices are more apt to sign on to 
opinions with which they do not fully agree, but with which their disagreement is not 
powerful enough to warrant disrupting the solid coalition of Justices of which the 
particular Justice is a member. Empirical studies of opinion assignment in the second 
Warren Court track this claim. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (discussing the 
work of Forrest Maltzman and Paul J . Wahelbeck). 
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B. The New Deal Court 
The power of the President and the Senate to use their 
appointment and confirmation powers to transform Supreme Court 
decisionmaking were on full display during the New Deal Court from 
1937 to 1949.176 In 1938, President Roosevelt put two final nails into 
the coffin of the Lochner era,177 replacing two of the Court's 
staunchest proponents of laissez-faire (Justices Willis Van Devanter 
and George Sutherland) with New Dealers Hugo Black and Stanley 
ReedY8 These appointments guaranteed that the Court, in fact, 
would uphold both federal and state efforts to regulate the 
economy-something that it had just begun to do (with Owen 
Roberts's apparent defection from laissez-faire in the wake of 
Roosevelt's 1936 electoral landslide).179 By 1940, Roosevelt further 
176. For sources detailing Roosevelt's appointments to the Supreme Court, see 
generally ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & ROY M. MERKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED 
JUSTICES (1978); CLARE CUSHMAN, THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED 
BIOGRAPHIES 1789-1993, at 376-420 (1993); and Ill-Y THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS (Leon Friedman & Fred 
L. Israel eds. , 1995). 
177. The Lochner era (1890-1937) is a period in which the Court often struck down 
state and federal efforts to regulate the economy by, among other things, limiting the 
reach of Congress's commerce power and reading economic liberties into the Constitution. 
For an excellent overview of this period, see generally HOWARD GILLMAN, THE 
CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS 
JURISPRUDENCE (1993). 
178. Van Devanter and Sutherland were two of the so-called Four Hoursemen, "a 
quartet of adamantly conservative judges whose ideas had been molded in the heyday of 
laissez-fare in the late nineteenth century, voting" together to "[strike] down more 
important socioeconomic legislation than at any time in history." LEUCHTENBURG, supra 
note 122, at 168. For a competing perspective of these Justices, see BARRY CUSHMAN, 
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 34--43 (1998) (highlighting the profound role of 
legislative drafting in the pre-1937 Court's repudiation of early New Deal reforms). My 
previous writings have highlighted the importance of lawyering-while also calling 
attention to the profoundly important role of the 1936 elections in the so-called switch-in-
time. See Neal Devins, Government Lawyers and the New Deal, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 
250-54 (1996). 
179. When Roberts joined the liberals on the Court, he joined a coherent bloc of 
Justices. The liberals had joined together in dissent when the Court was invalidating New 
Deal reforms and, after the Roberts switch, continued to vote as a "tight bloc; they had to 
remain cohesive in order to muster a majority." Russell W. Galloway, Jr., The Third 
Period of the Warren Court: Liberal Dominance (1962-1969), 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
773, 788 n.22 (1980). 
On the question of whether Roberts was moved by external forces (the Court-
packing plan or the 1936 elections) or internal forces (better lawyering or better legislative 
drafting), see CUSHMAN, supra note 178, at 84-105 (using "minimum wage cases" to 
highlight internal forces in explaining Justice Roberts's so-called switch-in-time); 
LEUCHETENBURG, supra note 122, at 132--{i2 (highlighting the Court-packing plan); and 
Devins, supra note 178, at 250--{i7 (rejecting Court packing as the source of the switch and 
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solidified his New Deal Court with three more appointments to the 
Court. By 1943, eight of the nine Justices were FDR appointees. The 
consequence of all this: the shift away from demanding judicial 
scrutiny of economic regulation was more than guaranteed; in its 
stead, the Court turned its attention towards individual rights. 
The series of events culminating in the formation of the New 
Deal Court began with the 1935-1936 power struggle between the 
"Old Court" and Roosevelt over the fate of the New Deal. The New 
Deal, proclaimed Roosevelt, "implied that the Government itself was 
going to use affirmative action to bring about its avowed objectives 
... [and] that a new order of things designed to benefit the great mass 
... would replace the old order of special privilege."180 "Swept into 
office with a mandate to repair the ravages of the Depression,"181 
Congress and the White House set about to revamp the relationship 
between the federal government and the American people-pushing 
through (sometimes sight unseen, sometimes with less than an hour of 
debate) poorly designed legislative reforms.182 For the Supreme 
Court, New Deal initiatives were met with skepticism. The Court 
began to hear cases involving federal legislation in December 1934, 
and it quickly became clear that the administration would "pa[y] the 
costs of sloppy procedures [and] poor draftsmanship," especially 
given a cohesive four-Justice bloc of conservatives who "despised the 
New Deal program as anti-American and socialistic and condemned 
it out of hand as unconstitutional. "183 More to the point: one of the 
Court's two moderates (typically Associate Justice Owen Roberts but 
arguing that Roberts was moved by both the 1936 elections and lawyering/legislative 
drafting). 
For the purposes of this Article, it does not matter which account is correct. No 
one disputes that FDR's nominees were like-minded on the question of economic 
regulation and, as such, operated as a coherent Court. Likewise, there is good reason to 
question whether Roberts's 1937 switch, by itself, would have resulted in a fundamental 
retooling of Court doctrine. As Bill Ross observed: "[Roberts and Hughes] remained 
more restrained in their doctrinal positions than did their more liberal brethren" and, 
consequently, the New Deal Court's embrace of economic legislation was a by-product of 
"death and resignations produc[ing] numerous vacancies that Roosevelt was able to fill 
with justices who did not disappoint him." WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP 
. OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES: 1930-1941, at 134, 136 (2007). 
180. Introduction, 2 PUB. PAPERS 3, 5 (Nov. 1, 1937). 
181. PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LA WYERS 3 (1982). 
182. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 122, at 32-33 (discussing the enactment of the 
Railroad Retirement Act whose provisions were questioned by the President before 
signing). 
183. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, THE WARREN COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY 
4 (2001}. 
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sometimes Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes) joined the 
conservative bloc to rule against New Deal initiatives.184 
When Roosevelt was able to seize control of the Court in 1937, a 
coherent Court advanced his New Deal agenda by overturning 
precedent and pursuing doctrinal innovations that insulated 
governmental efforts to regulate the economy. From 1937 to 1944, 
the New Deal Court had created a "new constitutional order," 
overruling thirty cases-"two-thirds as many as had been overruled in 
the Court's previous history."185 Over the course of its twelve-year 
tenure (1937 to 1949), the Court handed down forty-two rulings that 
overturned at least fifty-nine of its prior decisions.186 The majority of 
these decisions had broad support-with only five of these cases 
decided by a five-to-four vote (as compared to ten unanimous 
overruling decisions) .187 
The legacy of the New Deal Court was "free-wheeling 
adjudication."188 The Court "thoroughly repudiated the entire 
doctrinal system of constitutional limitations on federal power over 
the national economy" in a series of decisive strokes in the late 1930s 
and early 1940s.189 Rather than reinterpret or work against the 
backdrop of existing precedent, the Court proclaimed that "the 
ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and 
not what we have said about it [in past decisions]." 190 
Correspondingly, in "swiftly" overruling longstanding precedent, 191 
the Court did more than put in place a legal regime backed by the 
184. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 122, at 208-15. For his part, Roosevelt lashed out at 
the Court's conservatives for taking the country back to the "horse-and-buggy" days and, 
ultimately, sought to appoint a coherent group of pro-New Deal Justices through his ill-
fated Court-packing plan. The Two Hundred and Ninth Press Conference, 4 PUB. 
PAPERS 200,209 (May 31, 1935). 
185. POWE, supra note 1, at 485--86. 
186. Albert P. Blaustein & Andrew H . Field, Overruling Opinions in the Supreme 
Court, 57 MICH. L. REV. 151, 184-94 (1958); see also Banks, supra note 122, at 266 
(highlighting a correlation between the number of overrulings and the changing 
composition of the Court); S. Sidney Ulmer, An Empirical Analysis of Selected Aspects of 
Lawmaking of the United States Supreme Court, 8 J. PUB. L. 414,414-36 (1959) (detailing a 
correlation between Senate confirmation hearings and Court overrulings; and showing a 
positive correlation in general and a strikingly positive correlation from 1939-1941, where 
six Senate confirmations yielded twenty-three overruled decisions). 
187. See Blaustein & Field, supra note 186, at 184-94. 
188. Raoul Berger, The Activist Legacy of the New Deal Court, 59 WASH. L. REV. 751, 
751 (1984). 
189. Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution , 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 47 (1999). 
190. Graves v. New York ex rei. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1938) (Frankfurter, J ., 
concurring). 
191. BORK, supra note 149, at 156 (discussing the New Deal Court). 
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President and Congress. It also overruled important precedents in 
cases where nobody asked it to do so. Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins192 is the most striking example of this practice. In Erie, 
both parties sought to preserve Swift v. Tyson, 193 that is, the federal 
courts' then-existing practice of applying federal common law in 
diversity cases. 194 The Court, however, overruled Swift without 
briefing-concluding that it, and not the parties to a controversy, 
decides whether a legal argument is or is not waivable.195 Another 
(perhaps more striking) example of the Court unilaterally overruling 
precedent is Helvering v. Hallock. 196 In Helvering, the Court 
"overruled fifty [precedents] ... five of which were its own, merely in 
order to change a rule of statutory construction."197 
Against this backdrop, it is little wonder that the New Deal 
Court pursued significant doctrinal innovations-particularly with 
respect to the power of Congress and the states to regulate economic 
issues. Consider, for example, the Court's repudiation of Hammer v. 
Dagenhart's198 constrained view of federal regulatory power and its 
embrace of seemingly limitless power in Wickard v Filburn. 199 
Hammer struck down a federal statute prohibiting the shipping (in 
interstate commerce) of goods manufactured by children within 
specified age ranges.200 Concluding that the production and 
manufacture of goods were not part of commerce, the Court boldly 
claimed that our federalist system would be "destroyed" by such 
congressional encroachments into the state police power.201 Nearly 
twenty-three years later, the New Deal Court unanimously overruled 
Hammer in United States v. Darby202 and, in so doing, rejected the 
192. 304 u.s. 64 (1937). 
193. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
194. For an excellent discussion on this point, see generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., 
BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 100 (2000). 
195. On the appropriateness of the Court sua sponte asserting its power to control a 
case's underlying legal regime, compare generally Neal Devins, Asking the Right 
Questions, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 251 (2000) (defending Supreme Court's sua sponte power), 
with Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Should Have Remained Silent: Why the Court Erred 
in Deciding Dickerson v. United States, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 287 (2000) (criticizing the 
Court's sua sponte consideration of Congress's power to statutorily overrule Miranda). 
196. 309 u.s. 106 (1940). 
197. S. Sidney Ulmer, Book Review, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 418, 418 (1996) (reviewing 
SAUL BRENNER & HAROLD J. SPAETH, STARE lNDECISIS: THE ALTERATION OF 
PRECEDENT ON THE SUPREME COURT, 1946-1992 (1995)). 
198. 247 u.s. 251 (1918). 
199. 317 u.s. 111 (1942). 
200. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 268--69 n.l, 277. 
201. !d. at 276. 
202. 312 u.s. 100 (1941). 
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Lochner Court's distinction between intrastate manufacture and 
interstate shipment.203 At that time, however, there was reason to 
think that the Court expected Congress to assemble some type of 
record to back up its invocation of Commerce Clause authority. Not 
only did the Court encourage Congress to make findings that 
commerce indeed was affected, the Court's job was made easy by 
Congress's "sustained and increasingly thoughtful" efforts to 
demonstrate the nexus between its regulatory scheme and our 
increasingly integrated national economy.204 
For this very reason, the Secretary of Agriculture's 1941 efforts 
to extend a quota on wheat production to a farmer who grew wheat 
for home consumption seemed vulnerable to constitutional attack. 
The Agriculture Adjustment Act, the law that authorized the 
Secretary's actions, was passed without a factual record.205 In 
defending this statute, the government relied on stipulated facts.206 
Indeed, when the Court heard oral arguments in Wickard (in May 
1942), the Justices initially voted to remand the case so that a trial 
court could make additional factual findings.207 But this nod to 
limited judicial review of congressional invocations of the Commerce 
Clause was abandoned and, in its stead, the Court effectively granted 
Congress carte blanche authority to use its Commerce Clause power 
to regulate anything arguably economic. Not only did the Court 
dispense with the requirement that Congress assemble some type of 
record, Wickard explicitly recognized that Congress may regulate 
economic conduct "trivial by itself" so long as the aggregation of 
similar activity by other actors affects interstate commerce.208 
Recognizing (in private correspondence) that we no longer have 
"legal judgment upon economic effects which we can oppose to the 
policy judgment made by Congress in legislation," Wickard's author, 
203. !d. at 116-17. 
204. Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional 
Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695, 711 (1996). 
205. Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1138 (2000). 
206. /d. 
207. ld. 
208. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942). For an excellent treatment of 
Wickard's reach and the factual context of the decision, see Jim Chen, The Story of 
Wickard v. Filburn: Agriculture, Aggregation, and Congressional Power over Commerce, 
in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES, supra note 17, at 69. 
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Associate Justice Robert Jackson, observed: "I really know of no 
place ... where we can bound the doctrine . ... "209 
Wickard exemplifies what a coherent Court can do. Not needing 
to engage in horse trading over votes, a coalition of five or more 
Justices can advance an expansive view of the law. Furthermore, 
when prior precedents are at odds with that view of the law, the Court 
(as it did in Darby) can simply overturn the earlier precedent. Unlike 
the post-1962 Warren Court, however, New Deal Court decisions 
embracing federal and state regulation of economic activities were 
not countermajoritarian in any way. 
One final comment about the New Deal Court: that the Court 
operated as a coherent Court on economic questions does not mean 
that the Court was coherent in all respects. Roosevelt used his 
appointment power to ensure that the Court would allow the 
regulatory state to grow without judicial interference. But Roosevelt 
was not especially interested in constitutionalizing civil liberties and 
civil rights.210 At the time of his proposed Court-packing plan, the 
issue of economic regulation (including the power of government to 
establish a regulatory state) was the only one that mattered.211 New 
209. Cushman, supra note 205, at 1143 (quoting a memorandum from Justice Jackson 
to his law clerk, Costelloe); id. at 1145 (quoting a letter Justice Jackson sent to his friend, 
and later Associate Justice, Sherman Minton). 
210. For example, the Roosevelt Justice Department steered clear of Supreme Court 
litigation involving Texas's practice of prohibiting non-whites from voting in the 
Democratic primaries. See Michael J. Klarman, The White Primary Rulings: A Case Study 
in the Consequences of Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 55, 79 
(2001). Moreover, Roosevelt backed the World War II internment of Japanese 
Americans (and did not end the internment until Felix Frankfurter notified the 
administration that the Supreme Court was set to rule against the administration in Ex 
Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944)). See LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL 
DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 249-51 (4th ed. 2006); Patrick 0. Gudridge, Essay: 
Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933, 1934 (2003). Finally, Roosevelt used his 
"plethora" of Supreme Court nominees to advance his regulatory agenda. Civil rights and 
civil liberties issues played no meaningful role in these appointments (and, indeed, FOR's 
Supreme Court nominees did not operate as a cohesive group when deciding cases 
implicating civil rights and liberties). See Jack M. Balian & Sanford Levinson, The 
Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to National Coalition 
State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 497 (2006); Harry G. Huspelling, The Roosevelt Court 
and the Changing Nature of American Liberalism, in FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUPREME COURT 216, 238 (Stephen Shaw et al. eds. , 2004). 
211 . On Roosevelt's interest in centralizing governmental authority, see generally PERI 
E. ARNOLD, MAKING THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY 81-117 (1986); RICHARD 
POLENBERG, REORGANIZING ROOSEVELT'S GOVERNMENT (1966); and Barry D. Karl, 
Constitution and Central Planning: The Third New Deal Revisited, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 
163. 
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Deal reforms concerned economic matters, not individual rights;212 at 
the time of Court-packing, the Court's docket had next-to-no cases 
implicating civil liberties and civil rights.213 With the Court's approval 
of the modern welfare-regulatory state, the Court inevitably turned to 
other matters-and that meant the Court turned its attentions to 
individual rights issues.214 "Having abdicated the responsibility of 
determining whether legislation was rationally related to a legitimate 
public purpose," as Howard Gillman put it, "judges created for 
themselves a new role in the political system, one that involved 
identifying those 'preferred freedoms' or 'suspect classifications' that 
might provide a basis for trumping the otherwise unrestrained power 
of the modern legislature."215 Here, the Court 's liberals divided-
over the appropriateness of deferring to governmental conduct that 
limited civil liberties, over the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and much more.216 This division 
persisted through the end of the pre-1962 Warren Court.217 
III. CONCLUSION: PRECEDENT AND THE ROBERTS COURT 
By highlighting differences between coherent and incoherent 
Courts, this Article has backed up a series of commonsense claims 
about the role of ideological cohesion in Supreme Court 
decisionmaking. In particular, coherent Courts are far more willing 
than incoherent Courts to overturn landmark constitutional 
precedents, to pursue doctrinal innovations, and to embrace rule-like 
decisionmaking (in an effort to bind lower courts, government 
officials, and others). This Article has also called attention to some 
not-so-obvious differences between coherent and incoherent Courts. 
On a coherent Court, power resides with a majority coalition, not the 
median Justice. Specifically, Justices in the majority coalition rarely 
212. I do not mean to suggest that individual rights played no role in New Deal 
policymaking. President Roosevelt, for example, proposed a second Bill of Rights on 
January 11, 1944. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR'S 
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 1-2, 9-14 (2006}; 
William Forbath, Rights Stuff, AMERICAN PROSPECT, Aug. 13, 2004 (reviewing 
SUNSTEIN, supra). 
213. See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 122, at 235 (noting that only two of 160 written 
opinions in the 1935 Term implicated civil rights and liberties). 
214. See id. at 235-36; KECK, supra note 104, at 17-37. 
215. GILLMAN, supra note 177, at 202--03. 
216. KECK, supra note 104, at 26-37 (noting this divide, especially the competing 
jurisprudential approaches of Felix Frankfurter and Hugo Black). 
217. See id. at 38-67 (noting Frankfurter's profound role in shaping pre-1962 Warren 
Court decisionmaking and, relatedly, the inability of the Warren Court to operate as a 
coherent Court until Goldberg took Frankfurter's seat). 
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break rank and, as such, are more willing to sign onto opinions with 
which they disagree.218 During the post-1962 Warren era, for 
example, the Chief Justice paid little attention to ideological 
considerations when assigning opinions.219 The reason: the majority 
coalition stayed together, and individual Justices were typically 
willing to defer to their colleagues' decisions (even if they would have 
written a somewhat different opinion).220 Likewise, the New Deal 
Court granted Congress more power than some members of the 
majority coalition thought appropriate.221 
In sharp contrast, power resides with the median Justice on an 
incoherent Court. During the pre-1962 Warren Court, Justices 
Frankfurter and Harlan pushed for constitutional avoidance in 
antisubversive cases (even though four members of the Court would 
likely have been willing to issue pro-civil liberties constitutional 
rulings).222 During the Rehnquist Court, Justice O'Connor and, to a 
lesser extent, Justice Kennedy sought to narrow the scope of Court 
decisionmaking through the filing of concurring opinions and/or 
conditioning their vote on the majority making concessions-giving 
them wiggle room to rule differently in related cases.223 
Differences between coherent and incoherent Courts are also 
relevant in understanding the models that political scientists use in 
studying the Court. For a coherent Court, Justices in the majority 
coalition typically vote their legal policy preferences (since they agree 
with each other). At the same time, the doctrine produced by a 
coherent Court may not reflect the precise preferences of Justices in 
the majority coalition (since they are more apt to defer to an opinion 
writer-with whom they generally agree-than to demand 
concessions). Coherent Courts, moreover, are willing to risk political 
backlash. They have stronger policy preferences and, as such, will 
only back away from those preferences when there is very good 
reason to fear retaliation. For this reason, Warren Court liberals did 
218. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text (noting intra-Court agreement 
rates); supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting the deference accorded opinion writers 
by other Justices in majority). 
219. See Maltzman & Wahelbeck, supra note 4, at 560-61. 
220. For general treatments of this subject, see EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 6, at 
95-107. See generally Chris W. Bonneau et al., Agenda Controls, the Median Justice, and 
the Majority Opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 891 (2007) 
{documenting Supreme Court decisions between 1969 and 1986 where typically the 
agenda-setting power of the majority opinion author was most influential on judicial 
outcomes). 
221. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
222. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text. 
223. See supra Part LA. 
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not back away from pro-Communist rulings in the wake of failed 
efforts to strip the Court of jurisdiction (and did retreat from their 
criminal procedure revolution after Congress enacted legislation that 
ostensibly reversed Miranda).224 Put another way, the attitudinal 
model largely prevails on a coherent Court, although opinion writers 
on the majority coalition exercise disproportionate power and some 
attention is paid to external factors (including, for example, political 
backlash). 225 
By contrast, the attitudinal model appears to be an unreliable 
predictor for an incoherent Court. Swing Justices have comparatively 
weak policy preferences and, as such, are more apt to pay attention to 
the risk of backlash, elite opinion,226 and their desire to maintain 
power (by maintaining their median Justice status).227 Consider, for 
example, Justice Frankfurter's and Justice Harlan's backing away 
from pro-civil liberties rulings in antisubversive cases. It may be that 
these Justices feared congressional reprisals (the Court-curbing bill 
was barely defeated) and/or these Justices may have been stung by 
the criticism of bar groups, distinguished jurists, and lawmakers.228 
Likewise, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor seemed very sensitive to 
external forces-going so far as to emphasize (when reaffirming Roe 
in Casey) both the costs of "overrul[ing] under [political] fire" and 
explicitly linking the Court's "legitimacy" to people's "confidence in 
the Judiciary."229 Correspondingly, median Justices on an incoherent 
224. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Congress's 
response to Miranda, see Cassell, supra note 174, at 194-97. 
225. There is one other reason why the attitudinal model may place too much emphasis 
on the policy preferences of the median Justice. In particular, the majority coalition 
operates as a group and it may be that the median Justice does not pull other members of 
the group to their policy preferences. The median Justice, as noted above, might defer to 
the opinion writer. It may also be that the preferences of the median member of the 
majority coalition is a better bellwether for how the Court will rule than are the 
preferences of the median member of the Court. 
226. "Elite opinion" includes the views of, among others, academics, journalists, 
distinguished jurists, and bar groups. For a provocative treatment of the importance of 
elites and other groups to judicial decisionmaking, see generally BAUM, supra note 118. 
227. For treatment of this subject, see generally id. (suggesting that Supreme Court 
Justices are interested in maintaining their status among groups that matter to them). As 
to whether Baum is correct, it depends. His arguments are most persuasive in the case of 
swing Justices and less persuasive with respect to Justices who sit on a coherent Court-
who, as noted above, are more apt to vote their policy preferences (even if the final 
decision is not precisely what they would have written). 
228. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text. 
229. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992). For a more 
detailed treatment of the role of external forces in O'Connor and Kennedy 
decisionmaking, including the decision not to hear divisive religion and race cases, see 
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Court-as noted above-are more likely to engage in strategic 
bargaining over the content of majority opinions and/or file 
concurring opinions. For all these reasons, incoherent Courts do not 
seem driven by policy-maximizing decisionmaking. Policy 
preferences, no doubt, figure into decisionmaking, but external forces 
also figure into the decision, as does internal strategic behavior (such 
as Chief Justice Rehnquist's efforts to cobble together a five-Justice 
majority in Glucksberg).230 
* * * 
What then of the Roberts Court and its attitudes towards 
precedent? Much has been made about the perceived preferences of 
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alita to narrow and 
reinterpret precedent (rather than to overrule disfavored 
precedent).231 For reasons detailed in this Article, it is premature to 
speculate on whether Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alita truly 
prefer to operate as legal craftsman or whether they would prefer to 
overturn disfavored precedent and make significant doctrinal 
innovations.232 Specifically, after two Terms, the Roberts Court is an 
incoherent Court. There is a solid liberal block of four (that typically 
operates as a coherent block, signing onto each other's opinions in 
significant cases);233 there is a less solid but generally cohesive block 
generally Neal Devins, Congress and the Making of the Second Rehnquist Court, 47 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 773 (2003). 
230. See supra Part I.A.l. 
231. The Court has been criticized from both the right (for not overruling) and the left 
(for ignoring stare decisis through dishonest opinions that, in fact, nullify longstanding 
precedent). Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
wp/uncategorized/commentary-the-assault-on-faux-judicial-restraint (June 25, 2007, 17:14 
COT) (discussing Justice Scalia's criticism of the Court for not overruling precedent); 
Posting of Geoffrey R. Stone to The Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
geoffrey-r-stone/roberts-alito-and-the-ru_b_54273.html (June 28, 2007, 19:30 EST) 
(criticizing Scalia and Roberts for writing opinions guided by "rank ideology, ... (not] 
respect for the rule of law"). For a discussion both of Chief Justice Roberts's and Justice 
Alita's purported commitment to judicial modesty (including adherence to precedent), as 
well as a preliminary assessment of why the Roberts Court "will not make constitutional 
law in an unusually modest fashion," see David E. Klein, Modesty, of a Sort, in the Setting 
of Precedents, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1213, 1245 (2008). 
232. On this point, former Kennedy clerk Michael Dorf speculated that Roberts and 
Alito are acting strategically-appealing to Kennedy by making "incremental moves and 
not acknowledging when he's overturning precedents." Morning Edition: The Roberts 
Court and the Role of Precedent (National Public Radio broadcast July 3, 2007), available 
at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=11688820 (quoting Michael 
Dorf). 
233. See Epstein et al., supra note 2, at 1319, 1328 (noting that the current Court 
consists of four liberals and four conservative Justices in addition to Justice Kennedy); see 
also TUSHNET, supra note 66, at 49-70 (contrasting the competing decisionmaking styles 
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of four conservatives (who typically agree with each other on 
outcomes but do not issue unitary opinions that speak for all four 
Justices).234 And one Justice, Anthony Kennedy, stands in the 
middle. Indeed, as Lee Epstein's Article in this Symposium Issue 
demonstrates, Kennedy's ideological preferences are significantly 
more conservative than the liberal bloc and significantly more liberal 
than the Court's four conservatives (so much so that there is no 
prospect of Kennedy consistently joining either the Court's liberals or 
conservatives ).235 
If presidential appointments resulted in a five-member 
conservative bloc, Kennedy's vote would no longer be salient-and, 
consequently, the Roberts Court could overrule precedent and 
pursue doctrinal innovations without fear of losing Kennedy's vote. 
This is particularly true today because the elected branches seem 
comfortable with the Court's assertions of supremacy and, more 
generally, the Court's power to invalidate federal statutes and 
executive initiatives.236 Likewise, if a Democratic President were able 
to use her appointments power to create a five-member liberal bloc, 
Kennedy's vote would not be consequential. Such a Court (with 
Roberts at the helm) might well overturn disfavored Rehnquist Court 
rulings and, in their stead, pursue progressive doctrinal innovations 
intended to bind elected officials and lower courts. 
For the time being, of course, Kennedy's vote is extremely 
salient. In the 2006-2007 Term, Kennedy was in the majority in each 
of the Court's twenty-four five-to-four rulings.237 In the nineteen 
cases where the Court split five to four along liberal-conservative 
lines, Kennedy joined the conservative bloc on thirteen occasions and 
the liberal bloc on six occasions.238 Likewise, in the 2005-2006 Term, 
of conservatives on the Rehnquist Court-a comparison that applies with equal force to 
the Roberts Court). 
234. See Epstein eta!., supra note 2, at 1320. 
235. See id. (noting "the gap between Kennedy and the Justices to his right and left"). 
236. See generally KEITH WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL 
SUPREMACY (2007) (highlighting ways in which the executive branch backs judicial 
supremacy); Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court's 
Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435 (2001) (discussing ways Congress has facilitated 
judicial assertions of supreme interpretive authority, including judicial invalidations of 
federal law). For a somewhat competing perspective, see Barry Friedman & Anna 
Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, 78 IND. L.J. 123, 125 (2003) (arguing that the 
Rehnquist Court's willingness to invalidate federal statutes is tied to fact that Congress 
agrees with such invalidations). 
237. See Charles Lane, Narrow Victories Move Roberts Court to the Right, WASH. 
POST, June 29,2007, at A4. 
238. ld. 
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Kennedy cast the decisive votes on cases where the Court divided on 
liberal-conservative lines,239 most notably ruling against the 
government in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.240 In the 2007-2008 Term, 
Kennedy is likely to be in the majority, if not casting the deciding 
vote, in key cases involving enemy combatants and the 
constitutionality of lethal injections.241 
When Kennedy and O'Connor were the "swing" Justices on the 
Rehnquist Court, Kennedy seemed willing both to write sweeping 
opinions (whose reasoning he might not be willing to extend to other 
cases) and to sign onto expansive opinions that he did not fully agree 
with (so long as those opinions did not refer to precedents with whose 
outcome he disagreed).242 Now that he is the indisputable median 
Justice on the Roberts Court, Kennedy may be playing things more 
cautiously-writing concurring opinions (as he did in Hamdan and in 
the pair of 2007 public school "affirmative action" cases)243 or by 
239. Charles Lane, Kennedy Reigns on the Supreme Court, WASH. POST, July 2, 2006, 
atA6. 
240. 548 u.s. 557 (2006). 
241. See Edward Lazarus, The Upcoming Supreme Court Lethal Injection Death 
Penalty Case: How It Will Likely Illustrate the Serious Ideological Divisions That Continue 
To Separate the Justices, FINDLAW'S WRIT, Sept. 27, 2007, http://writ.Ip.findlaw.com/ 
Iazarus/20070927.html; Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotus 
blog.com/wp/commentary-and-analysis/commentary-can-constitutional-issues-be-finessed 
(Dec. 5, 2007 13:33 CST). Indeed, some commentators have suggested that Kennedy-
after initially demurring on the enemy combatant case-supported the grant of certiorari 
in order to side with the liberals. Linda Greenhouse, Clues to the New Dynamic on the 
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2007, at All. In so doing (so the speculation goes), 
Kennedy hopes to respond to claims that he is not a true swing Justice but, instead, a 
junior varsity member of the Court's conservative wing. For a related argument, see 
Heather K. Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 104 (2007) (arguing that Kennedy is at once sensitive to his role as "swing Justice" 
on the Roberts Court and his longstanding belief in constitutional liberalism). Kennedy 
was in the majority in the case of Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. _, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008) 
(upholding the constitutionality of Kentucky's lethal injection protocol). 
242. See supra notes 41-49, 56-68 and accompanying text. For this reason, Lee Epstein 
may overstate things when highlighting the relative cohesiveness of the liberal and 
conservative blocs on the Roberts Court as the explanatory variable in understanding the 
Roberts Court's willingness to embrace sweeping precedents. Epstein et al., supra note 2, 
at 1303. It may be, instead, that Kennedy's willingness to sign onto opinions that he does 
not fully support is the key factor in explaining this phenomenon. 
243. For an analysis of Kennedy's decisions in the school cases, see Pamela S. Karlan, 
The Law of Small Numbers: Gonzales v. Carhart, Parents Involved in Community 
Schools, and Some Themes from the First Full Term of the Roberts Court, 86 N.C. L. REV. 
1369, 1387, 1389-91, 1393 (2008); and Gerken, supra note 241. See also Bill Mears, Justice 
Kennedy Works on His Swing, CNN.COM LAW CENTER, Jan. 29, 2006, 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/LA W/09/25/scotus.kennedy/index.html (noting that Kennedy 
"writes cryptically . . . suggesting a standard of his own making that is not fully 
developed"). 
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writing plurality opinions that try to find a middle ground between 
the Court's liberals and conservatives (something he did in United 
States v. Rapanos,244 a 2006 environmental law ruling).245 In this way, 
Kennedy may both give himself more room to "swing" in subsequent 
cases and give lower courts and elected officials significant leeway to 
interpret Supreme Court decisions.246 Whether or not Kennedy acts 
more cautiously, one thing is clear: the Roberts Court is, for the time 
being, an incoherent Court. It is unlikely to overrule significant 
constitutional precedent or embrace rule-like doctrines that will bind 
it, lower courts, and government officials. 
244. 547 u.s. 715 (2006). 
245. Charles Lane, Justices Rein in Clean Water Act, WASH. POST, June 20,2006, at Al. 
246. Alternatively, Kennedy can do what he did on the Rehnquist Court-embrace 
sweeping opinions whose logic is at odds with other opinions that he has written or joined. 
This is what Kennedy seemed to do in the Court's 2007 opinion upholding federal partial-
birth abortion legislation. Gonzalez v Carhart, 550 U.S. _, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); see 
Fried, supra note 68 ("Justice Kennedy fails to come to grips with his own jurisprudence 
.... "). Writing for the majority, Kennedy paid short shrift to opinions he had written 
about both abortion rights and Congress's obligation to engage in meaningful fact finding 
when enacting legislation at odds with an existing Supreme Court ruling. See Fried, supra 
note 68 (criticizing Kennedy for failing to follow earlier precedent, some of which he 
authored). On the other hand, Kennedy added a curious caveat to his approval of the 
federal ban-noting that the decision was a facial challenge and suggesting that he might 
rule the statute unconstitutional in an "as applied" challenge. See id. In this way, 
Kennedy kept his options open. For a competing perspective on Kennedy's role on the 
Roberts Court, see Cass R. Sunstein, Split Decision, in lNST. OF BILL OF RIGHTS LAW, 
2007-2008 SUPREME COURT PREVIEW 484, 484 (2007) (claiming that Kennedy, like 
Roberts and Alito but unlike Scalia and Thomas, "avoids theoretical ambition" in his 
decisio.ns ). 
